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ABSTRACT 
THESIS ON: PROCEDURAL ISSUES OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
          SYSTEM- Exploring Facts About Evidentiary Matters. 
 
By 
Gony Md. Osman 
 
Dispute settlement system of WTO is deemed to be the most effective forum to settle trade 
disputes between governments. WTO jurisprudence lacks exhaustive body of laws on 
evidence needed for discharging justice. Specially, on evidentiary matters WTO jurisprudence 
is silent. The adjudicators and contesting parties from different law family are in trouble in 
absence of threadbare rules on evidentiary matters. Not only the contesting parties, but also 
the adjudicators of the Panel and AB faces critical junctures in absence of complete code on 
evidence. The argument that other international courts as well do not have complete code on 
evidence
1
 is not tenable and based on real life judgment, as because, no other international 
court is dealing with cases having political as well as economic/trade implication. Moreover, 
almost every case of other international courts is different in nature from each other. In 
absence of wholesome code on evidence, over dependence on generally accepted principles, 
inherent power of the courts, jurisprudence of other international courts and jurisprudence 
developed by the AB is not good enough for a long lasting, sustainable as well as predictable 
adjudication system for multilateral trading system. However, DSU - being devoid of 
coordinated procedural details regarding evidence - is supplemented by some covered 
agreements having explicit laws on certain issues on evidence. Till then these few covered 
agreements are not well equipped as they provide some case/issue specific guidelines.  
 
                                           
1
 Judgment of 27 June 1996, ICJ Reports t 40, para.60(1986). Case regarding Military and Paramilitaer Activities in and against Nicaragua( Nicaragua v USA, 
the `Nicaragua case’)   
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of the Study 
Dispute Settlement System is one of the main pillars of WTO. Being the building block of 
multilateral trading system the mechanism is in operation since the emergence of WTO in 
1995. Since inception, the dispute settlement mechanism has been functioning as most 
important supra-national tribunal for settling trade related disputes. The members are 
obliged contractually to abide by the decision of WTO dispute settlement system. To be 
frank, WTO system has neither any jail nor has the power to inflict pecuniary penalty or 
other mandatory economic sanctions. The main thrust of the system is that, the 
mechanism upholds sovereignty of an independent country and builds on remedies agreed 
upon under WTO regime by them. Voluntary compliance by sovereign action of alleged 
member is the core of the effective functioning of the system.     
Main judicial part of the system is of two tiers - panel process and appellate review. These 
two tiers almost resemble usual court process. Similarly, the system is a set of several 
institutions as well. Procedural aspect regarding evidence meant to settle three questions 
of what to probe, how to probe and by whom to probe. Rules on evidentiary matters, in 
fact, supposed to guide the entire trial process as it provides a code of conduct for both 
adjudicators and the contesting parties as well.  
Judicial system without well defined law on evidence is beyond imagination in domestic 
dispute settlement. Interestingly supra-national judicial system like WTO does not have 
such codified law on evidence. This adduced curiosity for me to search for how 
evidentiary issues are being handled in WTO dispute settlement process. 
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The dispute settlement system of WTO encourages exercising principal of good faith 
between/among the parties in exchanging, collecting and presenting evidence. This 
doctrine of collaboration together with discretionary authority vested in panel to seek 
information is a lifeline for the system. In handling evidences of complex nature requiring 
scientific as well as econometric analysis and synthesis, the authority of the Panel to seek 
information deemed to be an effective weapon.  
AB has no remand power in the system. This may create huge gap as opportunity to 
adduce new arguments in Appellate stage is not lawful. Lack of remand power has wider 
consequences & ramification. Even allowing an opportunity to adduce new argument at 
Appellate stage may not be a exact substitute for remand system. The power of the AB is 
limited to the contended issues covered in the Panel report and legal interpretation 
developed by the Panel
2
.  
Objective assessment is the fast-track standard of reviewing the evidence by the Panel as 
it does not provide a definite yardstick to analyze the legislation of a sovereign nation
3
. 
But in absence of  any guidelines in DSU as to what type and what amount of evidence is 
required to make a presumption of truth objective assessment by the Panel is seems to be 
difficult. Relying on customary rules and individual faculty of the adjudicators are not a 
full proof solution as these may lead to distortion of evidence and non-harmonized 
analysis. Assumption, presumption, induction and deduction based not on clear- cut & 
well-set rules on evidence animated the debate to promulgate a all-exhaustive law on 
evidence. Parties as well as judges are in confusion whether to follow common law or 
civil law while facing evidentiary problems. For example, Argentina’s objection to accept 
                                           
2 Article 17.12 of DSU requires the AB to address each of the contended issues covered in the Panel report and legal interpretation developed by the Panel. 
3 Article 11 of DSU makes it compulsory for the Panel to make an objective assessment of the matters before it. 
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copies instead of original document is a good testimony to this confusion.
4
     
WTO jurisprudence allows much flexibility on different evidentiary issues.  For example 
regarding time frame for submission and sufficiency of evidence the DSU maintains 
much flexibility to ensure high quality reports. This flexibility has different dimensions as 
well. Firstly, countries from different law families may confuse the actual course of action. 
The judges coming from different law family may be in confusion in reaching decision on 
the basis of consensus. This flexibility leads to much liberty for the judges and liberty 
leads to high ethical standard. But there is no guarantee that this high ethical standard is 
common ethical standard. In fact, development of ethics varies depending on culture and 
years-long social taboos. Virtually, to ensure unity in diversity, a common platform is 
required. WTO provides a common platform bringing in unity in diversity. This common 
platform needs common rules for the players as well as referees.   
Flexibility in the DSU has other dimensions as well. Frequent practice of allowing 
delayed evidence may encourage the parties to take recourse of litigation technique which 
will ultimately cause delay in settlement of dispute. This flexibility not necessarily 
exerted obligation even to make adverse inference on delayed submission of evidence.  
Flexibility is also there for the Panel to make departure from the working procedure. It is 
interesting to see  whether this power and flexibility may be a possible solution to the 
Panel to address evidentiary matters not defined or clarified in DSU and other covered 
agreements.  
Unsolicited evidence from third parties may add value to the dispute settlement process. It 
seems bizarre to think that an important evidence will not be addressed simply because of 
its source. Interesting to note that even a NGO can produce evidence under the veil of 
                                           
4 Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles Apparels and Other Items Argentina raised objection on accepting copy of certain documents 
instead of originals. But the Panel ruled that submission of copies of original documents did not affect the probative value of evidence. WT/DS56/R, The Panel 
Report, para 6.58.  
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Panel’s right to seek information.5 But a third party having trade interest in the dispute 
cannot come up with evidence to unearth the truth. These issues are contradictory 
requiring further in-depth attention of the law makers. 
The flexibility, right as well as power of the adjudicators are supposed to be a tentative 
solution to different unsettled issues of evidence. But the world is not that much even. 
Parties, adjudicators as well as office staff associated with judicial process are coming 
from diverse law background. This diversification made the evidentiary issues complex 
requiring codified law on evidence.  
The complex adjudicatory system of WTO is mostly built on practice and procedures 
developed through GATT practice. However, Uruguay Round modified the GATT system 
for healing the problems of GATT system. Till then, the procedural aspect of WTO 
system is not exhaustive. Specially, evidentiary matters remain less focused in WTO 
jurisprudence. More importantly, making the procedural aspects unique and exhaustive is 
a Herculean task, though not impossible. Against this backdrop, the primary focus of the 
paper is to explore how key evidentiary matters are addressed in the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. The objectives of the paper would be met and progressed through 
issue-base discussion.  
1.2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is two folds. As discussed earlier, the research aims at finding 
how different evidentiary issues/matters are being addressed in the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. The secondary focus is on how the adjudicators of WTO are 
                                           
5 Article 13.1 empowered the Panel to seek technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. Further unsolicited evidence may be 
injected in under the veil of Article 12.1 of the DSU considering the Panel’s right to make addition or departure from Working Procedure.  
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dealing with different evidentiary matters in absence of codified detailed law on evidence. 
To enrich the above main two discourse the paper further targets to analyze how 
evidentiary laws/rules of other international jurisprudences and courts are spilling over to 
WTO mechanism. In setting objective of the study I was curious to see how the biggest 
international adjudication system is running without codified law on evidence. 
1.3. Methodology of the Study  
After getting a synopsis of the aim of this thesis it is pertinent to know the methodology 
to be used for the whole discourse. Needless to say, this is not a scientific or social 
research and hence it is not laboratory or data base analysis. Rather the discussion is truly 
based on the existing laws and documents about evidentiary matters if international 
disputes. Needless to say that, complete and detailed literature encompassing all the 
issues of evidence is not commonplace. So WTO laws, dispersed contribution by the 
scholars and decisions of the past GATT-dispute settlement practice as well as present 
WTO-dispute settlement process are analyzed meticulously with deep insight. Side by 
side other international laws on evidence and decision of other international courts are 
also got much importance to give the study multi-dimension. Chronological and issue 
based discussion are key in achieving the objectives of the paper.    
In search of in-depth knowledge and information about cases and decisions, I have 
analyzed panel and AB reports. Articles, research papers, and different official WTO 
documents also gave me ample information to judge evidentiary matters from different 
looks. Tracking WTO’s website has always been a beacon for me to keep in touch with 
the latest development of the area. Of great importance, taking the three courses on WTO 
related laws during my course work in KDI School of Public Policy and management 
opened the avenue to conduct the study. Specially, lecture by the professor and discussion 
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by the argumentative fellow course mates helped me a lot to garner knowledge. 
Experience I gathered being a Magistrate of lower judiciary of Bangladesh helped me a 
lot to inject practical perspective to the study. 
1.4. Literature Review 
International courts to a great extent are liberated from compulsion of defined procedural 
laws like evidentiary law and rules simply because detailed and well defined procedural 
laws are absent for them. Specially, these tribunals have a free-riding opportunity while 
dealing evidentiary matters during court proceedings. For example, ICJ opined that: 
“The Courts within the limits of its Statutes and Rules,……has freedom in estimating the 
value of the various elements evidence, though it is clear that general principals of 
judicial procedure necessarily govern the determination of what can be regarded as 
proved.”6  
Regarding probative value of evidence (cartographic materials) in relation to frontier the 
ICJ opined that “Maps can……have no greater legal value than that of corroborative 
evidence endorsing a conclusion at which a court has arrived by other means unconnected 
with maps”.7  It seems peculiar - if not bizarre- that international courts are running 
without vital legal infrastructure called law on evidence giving the adjudicators wider 
discretion. Needless to say that WTO judicial system is also prey to such legal lacuna. 
The adjudicators of WTO dispute settlement system are fortunate enough not to go 
through the defined and complete law on evidence. In fact the law makers spared 
themselves as well not to delve deep into such a critical issue. This privilege of the 
adjudicators and the inertia from the part of law makers of WTO have adduced much 
interest for the academicians and practitioners to come up with intellectual thinking on 
evidentiary issues to supplement the substantive laws. These scholarly contributions are 
                                           
6 Judgment of 27 June 1996, ICJ Reports t 40, para.60(1986). Case regarding Military and Paramilitaer Activities in and against Nicaragua( Nicaragua v USA, 
the `Nicaragua case’)   
7 Order of 10 January 1986, ICJ Reports at 583,para 56(1986).Case regarding Frontier Dispute(Burkina faso V Mali) 
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playing the role of pathfinder for the adjudicators of WTO court system. However, 
complete and blanket literature on evidentiary law still a far cry. 
As discussed earlier, WTO dispute settlement mechanism lacks well-set procedural 
framework posing a growing tension for multilateral trading system. Pauwelyn (1998) put 
importance on well matched procedural laws against the backdrop of matured substantive 
laws
8
. The growing need for matched procedural framework on evidence is further 
substituted by the fact that factual and legal issues ore somehow & some time overlapping. 
The difference between these two overstated frequently in legal discourse. Horn & 
Mavroidis (2007) found that, “…….. disagreement about facts can be formulated in terms 
of legal issues”.9 
It is widely expected that, findings, reasoning and decisions of the courts would be 
substantiated/supplemented even complemented or at least be built on economic logic as 
well. But the flip side of the coin is that many of the decisions of WTO dispute settlement 
system are criticized heavily as they devoid of economic analysis or logic. This legal 
vacuum is attributed to the absence of codified laws/rules on evaluation of evidence. 
WTO jurisprudence suggests a blunt weapon called ‘objective assessment’ to be the 
criterion of evaluation. Sykees (2003) came up with the argument that systematic entities 
are hard to be found
10
. Corroborating this idea Horn & Mavroidies assumed confusion 
about method of analysis
11
.      
Evidentiary standards applied by the adjudicators assumed much attention of the scholars 
as well. Grossman & Sykees (2006) studies how rule of waiver would affect the number 
                                           
8 Joost Pauwelyn. “Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement- Who Bears the Burden?” HeinOneline—1 J. Int’l Econ. L.  at 258. 1998. 
Concluding Remark. 
 
9 Horn,Henric,Mavroidis,Peter C .A Survey of the Literature on the WTO Dispute Settlement System.CEPR  Discussion Paper Series NO-6020 at 4.2007 
10 Alan O. (2003b) The Least Restrictive Means, University of Chicago Law Review. 70: 403-416.2007 
11 Horn,Henric,Mavroidis,Peter C.A Survey of the Literature on the WTO Dispute Settlement System. CEPR Discussion Paper Series NO-6020 at 34.2007 
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of claims
12
. Horn & Mavroides (2004) viewed that burden of proof is easy to be shifted to 
the respondent
13
. This easy shifting would multiply convictions. Scientific expert opinion 
and expert opinion on econometrics are also two facets of evidentiary standards requiring 
codified rules and research thereon. 
Panel’s right to seek information under the coverage of Article 11 of the DSU is 
challenging task for the Panel to exercise. It is challenging in the sense that, exercising 
such right produces a moral obligation for the adjudicators to receive amicus curie brief. 
Chakravarthi (2000) made an interesting and informative study on this issue terming AB 
as rule-less and DSB as powerless
14
. Panel right to seek information has to do with 
judicial fact finding. Judicial fact finding is relevant to avoid voluntary omission of 
evidence by the parties. There are arguments and counter arguments regarding 
maintaining an independent agency within WTO for investigation. John Jackson (1998) 
said that “a serious and prolonged fact-type hearing could easily bankrupt the resource 
allocation to the WTO dispute settlement system”15               
Determining level, quality or threshold of evidence is a crucial issue in many cases. It is 
important for both the adjudicators as well as parties to a dispute in WTO courts. WTO 
jurisprudence lacks clear-cut evidentiary threshold. For example, to initiate anti-dumping 
investigation countries are at dilemma as to decide the level or adequacy of evidence 
required before initiating investigation. Gingrich (1999) studied the evidentiary threshold 
needed for antidumping investigation putting opinion for well defined evidentiary 
standard/threshold
16
. 
                                           
12 Grossman, Gene M. and Alan Oslan O Sykes. European Communities- anti Dumping Duties on Import of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of DSU by India. 2006 
13 Horn,Henric, Mavroidis,Peter C. The Allocation of Burden of proof in Non Discrimination Cases before the WTO- cited in A Survey of the Literature on the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System. CEPR Discussion Paper Series NO-6020 at 35.2004 
14 Raghavan Chakaravarthi.” Ruleless Appellate Body and Powerless DSB”, South-North Development Monitor (SUNS) 2000, 
 
15  John H. Jackson. The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, 92.1998 
16 Gingerich, Tara . Why the WTO Should Require The Application of the Evidentiary Threshold Requirement in Anti Dumping Investigation.1999 
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In dispute settlement process a questions always comes forth as to who will present the 
evidence and who will bear the burden of proof. M. Kazazi (1996) observed that in the 
international tribunals each party has the responsibility to prove its claim according to the 
acceptable rule
17
. Interestingly, if all the parties bear the burden of proof then confusion 
arises whether all the parties have the same duty to present necessary evidence. Pauwelyn 
(1998) however, argued that parties bearing the burden of proof not necessarily have the 
resultant burden of presenting evidence
18
. Similarly, the opponent in the dispute 
settlement system of WTO has some responsibility resulting presentation of evidence kept 
in its disposal simply because the dispute settlement mechanism has an in-built element 
of principal of cooperation and good faith. As per the decision of AB, good faith in Article 
3.10 of DSU to be read with Rule 30(1) of the WP substantiated the right of the parties 
suggesting that conditional withdrawal in a particular case would neither diminish the 
said right nor would it stand on fair, prompt and effective disposition of a case.
19
 This 
principal of good faith is a fair attempt to ensure fairness in WTO judicial process. 
Panizzon (2007) opined that the WTO Panels have introduced constitutional ingredients 
to the WTO jurisprudence adopting the principles of fairness and good faith
20
. Botha 
(2002) studied the application of burden of proof in WTO and found that the doctrine 
introduced by the AB like burden of evidence burden of proof as well shift to the 
opponent as and when prima facie case is established by the proponent
21
.  
Lack of remand power of AB is a crucial issue for dispute settlement system of WTO. 
                                           
17 M. Kazazi.” Burden of Proof and Related Issues, A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunal” at 30.1996 
 
18 Joost Pauwelyn. “Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement- Who Bears the Burden?” HeinOneline—1 J. Int’l Econ. L. at 233. 1998. 
 
19 EC–Sardines, Appellate Body Report, para. 141. 
20 Marion Panizzon,Dr. Fairness, Promptness and Effectiveness: Creating a Good Faith Standard for WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures. NCCR TRADE    
   WORKING PAPERS No 2007/19, at 18. MARCH 2007. www.nccr-trade.org. 
21 Botha Hendrik Lambert. Burden of Proof in WTO Law. A study of the  manner in which the concept of burden of proof has been interpreted and applied by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.2002 
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Member of the AB Yasuhei Taniguch
22
 put emphasis on amendment of DSU to introduce 
remand power to remedy member states. He also suggested AB to be more sensitive on 
the issue of due process. Citing the example of France he argued that the judges cannot 
apply law on his/her own without listening the parties. He advised the same principal for 
dispute settlement mechanism.    
Like any judicial system dispute settlement system of WTO also got same importance for 
standard of review. It has a decisive role limiting the review power of the adjudicators. 
Using proceduralist approach Zleptnig (2002) argued that WTO legitimacy challenge of 
WTO can be withered way by applying standard of review by the panel. He further 
advised to adopt a strict proceduralist bias for fixing and using standard of review23. 
Use of presumption technique is a vital tool for the adjudicators to evaluate evidence. 
This technique is further needed to decide issues relating to prima facie case and rebuttal 
of the case by the defendant. However, Pauwelyn (1998) refused to accept presumption 
technique as a substantive rule to decide as to who assume the burden of proof24. 
To highlight the gap in DSU some case references may be cited here. In absence of 
categorical compulsion for holding consultation in Mexico-HFCS (Art.21.5) Panel was 
established. Mexico argued that the US had violated Article 6.2 DSU.  Mexico also 
argued that the dispute is not fruitful under the coverage of Article 3.7 DSU as the Panel 
was established without prior consultation.
25
 In Canada-Aircraft (1999) Canada refused 
number of times to provide information to the Panel on the plea that Brazil had not 
established prima face case. However AB reinforced the principal of good faith & 
                                           
22 Professor of Law, Senshu University Law School, Tokyo; Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University; LL.B., 1957, Kyoto University; LL.M., 1963, U.C. Berkeley 
School ofLaw; J.S.D., 1964, Cornell Law School; Appellate Body Member of  WTO 2000– 2007 
23 Zleptnig T Stefan.”The Standard of Review in WTO Law: An Analysis of Law, Legitimacy and the Distribution of Legal and Political Authority”. European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 6 .2002. N_ 17; at 19 .http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-017a.htm 
 
24 Joost Pauwelyn. “Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement- Who Bears the Burden?” HeinOneline—1 J. Int’l Econ. L. at 252. 1998 
25 Mexico-HFCS (Art.21.5), Appellate Body Report, paras 71-74. 
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collaboration maintaining that it is upon the Panel to seek information even before prima 
face is made by the opposing party.
26
 In EC-Sardins(2002) after the withdrawal of 
original notice of appeal by EC Peru asserted that there is no right of making appeal 
twice.
27
 Interestingly AB treated EC’s new notice as replacement notice.  
WTO jurisprudence is silent as well regarding estoppels. However, in Guatemala – 
Cement II as Mexico had not made allegations at the earliest opportunities regarding 
certain violations of Anti-Dumping Agreement Guatemala maintained that Mexico’s 
allegation was subject to estoppels.
28
  The Panel rejected Guatemala’s claim on the plea 
that Mexico was under no obligation to object immediately to the violations.
29
 Regarding 
admissibility of evidence US - Countervailing Duty Investigation of Drams Case is a 
perfect case of complexity and confusion. The panel refused to consider the evidence that 
was part of US’s investigation but was not cited in its decision imposing duties. The Panel 
considered the evidence ex post rationalization.
30
 
The legal system for international trade beneath the umbrella of WTO is still under the 
process of development and so does its jurisprudence. Scholarly contributions are playing 
an important role ceaselessly to further enrich both the trade literature and legal literature 
of WTO. A comparative study of the legal system has virtually opened up the new vista 
to decimate the confusion and tricky legal issues of WTO jurisprudence. AB rejected 
Panel’s finding and opined that it does not require Members to cite or discuss every piece 
of supporting evidence in its final determination.
31
 
                                           
26 Canada – Aircraft, Appellate Body Report, para.190 
27 EC-Sardins, Appellate Body Report, para 135  
28 Guatemala – Cement II, Panel Report, para 8.3 
29 Ibid 8.24 
30 US - Countervailing Duty Investigation of Drams Case, Appellate Body Report, Para 159 
31 Ibid 164 
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1.5. Outline of the Chapters 
WTO jurisprudence is a big legal literature and so does its procedural aspects. A detail 
discussion would require huge volume of work. The thesis aims at exploring associated 
evidentiary issues from different viewpoints. Formal discourse starts with giving an 
overview of the dispute settlement system in chapter two. For this, a supplementary 
pictorial presentation and time limit for settling disputes are shown as annex.  
Chapter three introduces us to out-world. Law of evidence applied for other international 
courts and some generally accepted principals – accepted to each law family- are 
discussed in this chapter. Analysis is done to show how interdependency is observed on 
evidentiary matters in absence of defined law of evidence. Chapter four focuses on 
finding relevancy and importance of law of evidence for settlement of trade dispute. In 
fact law of evidence, being regulator of the conduct of the parties, shows the path to be 
followed by all concerned in dispute settlement mechanism. In this chapter, an effort is 
done to unearth the evolutionary process of evidentiary rules as well. It further continues, 
to reveal the sources of evidentiary laws in WTO jurisprudence per se.  
Chapter five contains an analytical review on different specific issues. The countries, 
adjudicators as well as court’s staff are alike concerned with these issues. At the 
beginning efforts, has been made to discuss how prima facie of a case distributes burden 
of proof and burden evidence. It goes further to diagnosis why collaboration among the 
parties on exchanging evidence is a must in absence of policing mechanism to discover 
evidences which are in sole possession of either party. Relevant discussion is also made 
about the locus standai of the Panel on determining relevancy of evidence. Different 
technical issues like maintaining confidentiality of evidence, absence of remand system 
and its affect on evidentiary rules, implication of circumstantial evidence and economic 
13 
 
evidence are discussed side by side. This chapter as well contains a thorough discourse on 
adducing new evidence, expert opinion serving otherwise the purpose of investigating 
authority for the Panel and why remand power deserves newer attention. The chapter, 
inter alia, touched at how DSU accommodates three basic rules of due process. These are 
- bias rule, hearing rule and no evidence rule. These are virtually three basic monolithic 
pillars serving the purpose of due process. Discussion on due process, in this chapter, is 
followed by a threadbare analysis of rules on burden of proof, probative value of evidence. 
More importantly, this chapter critically analyzes other two fundamental issues namely 
rules on standard of review of evidence and standard of proof. Here it is pertinent to say 
that adjudicators need weighing mechanism to weigh evidences submitted by the parties. 
Techniques used by the adjudicators to evaluate evidences are also touched at.   
Some more technical evidentiary issues are accommodated as well in this chapter five. 
This penultimate discourse also studies the basic rules on how to present evidence, means 
of evidence and deposition, time limit for submission of evidence, responsibility of the 
parties while producing evidence, sufficiency of evidence & exclusion of evidence third 
parties’ evidence, unsolicited evidence and evidence from consultation stage are 
addressed by DSU and adjudicators. The discourse sequentially comes to an end with the 
concluding part in chapter six. Depending on the threadbare discussion summarizes the 
main findings of this study. Chapter seven outlines some thought provoking issues for 
interested readers.    
14 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
2. Overview of the Dispute Settlement System 
2.1. Basic Rules Guiding Dispute Settlement System 
Broadly dispute settlement system of WTO has four major steps; namely- consultation, 
panel proceedings, appellate review and implementation and enforcement. Each stage of 
this mechanism has defined timeframe
32
 to be followed by the adjudicators.  
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU) is the guiding rule of WTO 
dispute settlement system. The DSU- as Annex 2- is a part of Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter called WTO Agreement). Though 
the system seems to be new, pre-existing GATT regime is the central to it. Article 3.1 of 
the DSU reconfirms the adherence and application of Article XXII and Article XXIII of 
GATT 1947. Similarly Article XVI:I of WTO Agreement provides that “except as 
otherwise provided under this Agreement or Multilateral Agreements, the WTO shall be 
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the Contracting 
Parties to GATT 1947 and bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947”.  
Too much emphasize on GATT 1947 seems confusing, because it was meant for trade in 
goods. On the other hand, existing dispute settlement system covers any dispute arising 
out of any of the multilateral WTO agreements. These agreements are collectively called 
“covered agreements’’33 which are listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU. Some multilateral 
agreements under WTO system contain additional and special rights and obligations. 
Article 1.2 of DSU also recognized these special rules in its Appendix 2 following the 
                                           
32 Please refer to Annex- I 
33 Covered agreements WTO Agreements, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute and Plurilateral Agreements.   
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general notion that ‘‘special laws and subsequent legislative development will prevails 
over general laws’’.     
It is easily understandable that special rules and procedures contained in Appendix 2 will 
prevail over rules and procedures under “covered agreements” contained in Appendix 1 to 
the extent of difference. But what will be the way out in case a measure is challenged 
under two agreements and two covered agreements are conflicting with each other? We 
may argue that WTO system provides no rules for this. To find the explanation for this 
we have to look at the decisions of the Panel and AB. In Canada-Periodicals, the AB 
attuned to the Panel that “the obligations under GATT 1994 and GATS can co-exist and 
that one agreement does not override the other.”34 So the case law base jurisprudence 
prescribes that, when a Panel analyzes such issue under GATT, it should focus “on how 
the measures affect the goods involved”.35 When a Panel discusses the issue under GATS, 
it should focus “on how the measures affect the supply of the service or service suppliers 
involved”.36 The legal issues would be different when both GATT and GATS apply to a 
particular measure.  
WTO regime is a conventional or contractual treaty law within the meaning of Article 
38(1)(a) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)37. In other words the 
WTO legal system is not something that is isolated from public international law regime. 
The interpretive principles bear a good testimony to this idea. Article 3.2 of DSU 
categorically specifies the recourse to customary principles of interpretation in 
determining the right/privilege and duties/obligations of parties to the dispute. The AB 
found that:“ The GATT is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international 
                                           
34 Canada- Periodicles, The AB Report, para.20 
35 EC- Bananas, AB Report, para.221 
36 Id 
37 Article 38:1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
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Law”.38 The Body also found that in absence of explicit reference in DSU or the WTO 
Agreement, general principles of international law like good faith, due process, rules 
regarding burden of proof and the right to adequate representation are applicable to DSU 
process and are to be considered in interpreting WTO provisions.39  
Here, it is worth mentioning that canons, traditions, guidelines and sources for customary 
principles of interpretation emanate from Article 3140 and 3241 of the Vienna Convention 
(VC) on the Interpretation of Treaty. Article 31 of VC prescribes that “A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’’. Article 32 of the 
VC allows the use of background/preparatory work for the treaty agreement for 
clarification confusion or obscurity.  But the interpreter is at liberty to adopt a reading that 
would otherwise reduce the whole clause or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy.42     
However, on top of the other international agreements mentioned in the covered 
agreements and customary international laws, a Decision of the Ministerial Conference 
and General Council will be the superior source of law under WTO system.43 Such 
interpretation of covered agreements is binding upon the Panel and AB. 44  For 
interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agreement mentioned in Annex 1 of the WTO 
Agreement, recommendation by the Council monitoring the compliance of that 
                                           
38 US- Gasoline, The AB Report, p16,DSR 1996:I,3,at 16 
39 Korea- Procurement, Panel Report, para.7.96:’’Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between WTO Members. Such 
international law applies to the extent that WTO treaty agreements do not contract out from it.’’  
40
 Article 31: 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble 
and annexes:  
   (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which 
was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
41
 Article 32: Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 
31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
42 Reformulated Gasoline, p.22 
43 Article IX(2) of the WTO Agreement. 
44 Id,  
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Agreements would be the basis of decision. Three-fourth majority of the Members is also 
required to adopt an interpretation. 
2.2. Institutional Arrangement 
Dispute settlement system as a whole comprises of several institutions.45 The apex body 
is the Dispute Settlement Body or DSB. The DSB establishes Panels, adopts Panel and 
AB Reports, take care of the implementation of rulings and authorizes sanction against 
non-complying country.46 Next to the DSB, Panels and AB are mainly responsible for the 
adjudication which is the core of the system. 
The panel procedure of GATT 1947 is somehow retained under WTO system with 
necessary modification. Generally three panelists47 are in a Panel who are selected on ad 
hoc basis for each individual dispute from a list of persons proposed by WTO Members. 
The Panel reviews the factual as well as the legal issues of a dispute and the final 
outcome of the panel process is recommendation to be submitted to the DSB. 
The AB which reviews merely the challenged legal issues of Panel’s ruling is a 
permanent body. It is the final stage of the adjudication process under WTO dispute 
settlement system. The AB has seven persons appointed for four-year terms. Members 
hear the cases in divisions of three. Needless to say, the AB is the new outcome of 
Uruguay Round discussion. Apart from the above three main focused institutions, WTO 
Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions are also 
giving support to the system.   
                                           
45
Please refer to Annex- II 
46 DSU Article 2.1 
47 Panel may be composed of 5 persons in exceptional situation. 
18 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3. Law of Evidence in the Context of other International Courts 
3.1. Law of Evidence in Other International Courts 
It is widely accepted fact that international law traditionally remains liberal on evidentiary 
matters associated with inter-state disputes. Pauwelyn (1998) found that, “International 
procedure tends to be free from technical and detailed rules on evidence known municipal 
law”.48  This approach allows flexibility and leeway for the adjudicators to deal with the 
adduced evidence. Another facet of this liberal approach is that the different international 
laws and courts are fragmentary
49
 triggering unpredictability while facing evidentiary 
questions. So the evidentiary laws for the inter-state dispute settlement mechanism are 
transitory, dispute specific and sometimes court specific as well. The absence of 
comprehensive, coherent, consistent and codified laws of evidence may be attributed to – 
apart from the lenient view of the member states- the multiplicity of disputes. Moreover, 
inertia of the adjudicators to pass ruling on these complex nature of evidence fearing that 
the parties may not be willing to welcome the judgment/decisions. This unearths sheer 
ad-hocism in international dispute settlement mechanism.    
Now a days, international dispute settlement system has changed. International dispute 
settlement is now more rule-base rather than power-base. International courts- be it 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) or WTO Dispute Settlement Body(DSB)- are now 
facing increasingly evidentiary questions with much intensity and complexity having 
political and economic implication for the member states. Even more, sometimes 
                                           
48
 Joost Pauwelyn. “Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement- Who Bears the Burden?” HeinOneline—1 J. Int’l Econ. L. at 230. 1998 
49
 International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law, 54th Session of the International Law Commission, 
Geneva, 29 April-7 June and 22 July-16 August 2002,A/CN.4/L.628, para 6. It says “It is not considered a new concept, but rather a characteristic of 
international law which is 밿nherently a law of a fragmented world 
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sovereignty of a state come across while addressing evidentiary issues. Lack of common 
approach for international evidentiary laws might evolve as a major decision bottlenecks 
in near future for international courts and tribunals in discharging fair trial just 
administering of justice. In absence of uniform evidentiary laws more debates may be 
animated as well as treasured about the decisions of international courts due to 
inconsistent and unpredicted handling of evidence.  
Constituent law of the international courts and related treaties are supposed to be the 
building-bloc and potential sources to deal with the evidentiary issues. However, on 
diverse evidentiary issues, constitutional laws are silent. The gap in-built in the treaties, 
may be significantly bridged by applying the inherent or implied power of the court. 
Inherent power can be exercised so long it does not antagonize the purpose and object of 
the law establishing the court. Similarly, tenets and procedural rules developed by other 
international tribunals under the veil of inherent power may also be used in other courts 
of similar jurisdiction. 
Generally accepted principles and customary international laws are other significant sourc
es for international law on evidence. Secondary procedural laws or rules made by judges 
are also a widely recognized and important source of international evidentiary laws. Almo
st all the international courts/tribunals are entrusted with the power to formulate own rule
s of procedure or code of conduct or practice manual. Case laws, as well, feeding the inter
national courts with supportive literature as subsidiary means to understand evidentiary is
sues. McRae, said that “the WTO agreements are themselves creatures of international la
w; they are treaties binding only because of the underlying norm of international law pact
a sunt servanda’.50” 
                                           
50 Donald McRae, ‘Comments on Dr Claus-Dieter Ehlermann’s Lecture’ 97 American Society of International Law Proceedings 87, 89.2003 
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3.2. Generally Accepted Principles Regarding Evidence 
International courts/tribunals while dealing with inter-state disputes follow some tenants 
without much debate and questions. These generally accepted fundamental procedural 
principles are called ‘general principles of international procedural law’. The route of 
these principles is Article 38(1)(c)51 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Regardless of the nature of dispute, subject matter & courts, these principles are 
commonly used and subject to uniform practice by the adjudicators. This principles cast 
light on admissibility and taking of evidence. Simultaneously, these principles have 
interpretive role as well. Sooth to say, WTO judiciary maintained normative relationship 
with generally accepted principles to retain the standard of procedural justice. For 
example Pauwelin (2003) opined that “In international law, principles play an important 
role in filling the gaps left by the international legal order and to avoid a non liquet in 
rulings by international judges”.52 
The first and foremost principle is the right to fair trial. It ensures procedural equality of 
the contesting a case. This corollary developed to recognize and uphold the concept of 
sovereignty of the states. Sovereign equality results in the right to be heard. From the 
viewpoint of evidentiary rules this principles ensures unalienable right to the parties to 
present all relevant evidences in support of their claim. Side by side, it allows the parties 
access to evidence of the counter party to generate counter arguments. 
The idea of recognizing state autonomy also necessitates that the parties are the sole 
authority to bring a case before the court/tribunal and to define the scope the litigation. 
The courts should not step beyond what is asked by the contesting parties. The sovereign 
                                           
51 Article 38(c): the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
52 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to  Other Rules of International Law,129. 2003 
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parties have the right to bring an end to the dispute. This issue of autonomy brings forth a 
critical issue regarding the court & other independent organ’s right to adduce/discover 
evidence. In international criminal justice this principle is deviated may be because of the 
fact that international criminal court does not deal with state versus state cases. Same sort 
of deviation is observed in WTO dispute settlement mechanism which allows the Panel to 
seek information from any corner. The principal of public hearing is also present in 
almost every international dispute settlement system. WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
is one of the exceptions to this. The Panel meets in closed session and maintains secrecy 
on many issues.   
Regarding distributing/allocating duties and responsibilities on gathering evidence 
international courts follows modified adversarial model. It is holy marriage between 
adversarial and inquisitorial model. Parties to the disputes assume the primary 
responsibility for gathering evidences and proving specific case while the adjudicators 
have the inherent competence to draw out factual basis. Courts are also at liberty to 
adduce expert opinion, to call witness and to decide on if and when to call for evidence 
from the parties. 
Principal of cooperation and good faith are also two guiding principles in settling 
international dispute. Parties to the case are duty bound to cooperate the each other to 
ensure access to evidence/information so that the other party gets ample opportunity to 
make counter argument. This extensive disclosure obligation seems to be the backbone of 
the system. In fact international dispute settlement systems are not a mechanism to win a 
case by some cleverly acts. Nor it is driven purely by game theory. Rather the parties 
involved are pledge bound to cooperate to nurture a world public goods. Regarding 
enforcement of evidentiary rules the effective recourse for the courts is making adverse 
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inference although making adverse inference is not usual in international courts.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Evidentiary Laws and WTO Jurisprudence 
4.1. Relevance of Evidentiary laws in WTO Dispute Settlement System 
WTO dispute settlement system is a paradigm shift from GATT-1947 dispute settlement 
process. During GATT regime dispute settlement was basically a conciliation based 
mostly on diplomatic efforts. But WTO dispute settlement system is legalistic in the sense 
that the final decision of the process comes through an adjudication process. WTO 
dispute settlement process is not court in truest sense; but the system to a great extent akin 
to court proceedings. That is why the issue of substantive and procedural issues comes 
forward. The procedural laws basically determine the equity and efficiency of any judicial 
process. Substantive norms may be crippled due to inappropriate procedural system. 
Procedural issues of WTO system are more important because all the members of the 
multilateral system do not belong to same family of law. Due to diversification of the 
legal practice among the member states a well design trade-off is sine-qua-non for WTO 
dispute settlement system. 
In WTO dispute settlement system the regulation, rules, laws and action of a sovereign 
state are challenged. Losing a case results in changing/amending and sometimes repealing 
the whole law promulgated by people’s representative of an independent state53. So, 
settlement of dispute upholding the sovereignty of a state has made the whole process 
more challenging and onerous. In doing so, insufficient focus by the adjudicators on the 
procedural and technicalities of adjudication process- especially technicalities of dealing 
with evidence- will jeopardize the sacred aim of the process. The litigant’s view on the 
findings will be affected negatively which will ultimately undermine the predictability of 
                                           
53 Not only the executive decision; even some laws promulgated by Parliament may be challenged it WTO dispute settlement system. 
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the rule based multilateral trading system. 
Procedural rules ensure efficiency and equity of adjudication. Simultaneously, free and 
fair play of the parties is also guided by procedural matters. More importantly, it gives a 
supervisory tool to ensure the right and obligation of the parties. So, probative and 
prohibitive value of justice depends largely on procedural laws. On this matter the ruling 
of the AB is pertinent which goes ‘the procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are 
designed to promote, not the development of litigation techniques, but simply the fair, 
prompt and effective resolution of trade dispute.’54      
WTO introduced a dispute settlement system which has wider ramification and 
complexity. It has to deal with economic question like substitutability and complementary 
feature of goods, econometric issues of cause and effect of measures, accounting 
questions like valuation of goods, calculation of subsidy related issues, anti-dumping and 
counter-veiling duty determination. Other sensitive issues like environment, safeguards, 
health protection also has made the process a sensitive one. All these have a constant 
ethical compulsion on the adjudicators. So well designed elaborate procedural laws 
categorizing evidentiary laws are precondition for the dispute settlement system. The 
issue is further felt to be sensitive because the mechanism has the automatic adoption 
process of the Panel and AB report. Any error of law would be hampering the credibility 
of the process.    
Law of evidence is one of the important branches of laws required in a court procedure 
because it has pivotal toll in determination of any dispute. Law of evidence directs the 
parties as what are the materials, facts & information (hereinafter called evidence) to be 
brought to press home the demand made in complaints, how to bring those materials, 
                                           
54, US-FSC, AB Report ,para 166. 
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facts & information, who is to bring these evidence in which manner/procedure and under 
what compulsion & limitation as well as with what effect. Law of Evidence being branch 
of Adjective Law solve three questions – what, how and who.  
For the very complex nature of international trade dispute when parties fail to come to 
agreement on factual basis, the law of evidence provides the beacon to the Panel and AB 
to determine a case. Law of evidence finally paves the way for effective, efficient and 
objective enforcement of substantive laws of WTO jurisprudence. Virtually, the 
legitimacy of decisions of the Panel and the AB as well as the effectiveness of dispute 
settlement mechanism of WTO largely depends on the settlement of complex set of 
evidentiary rules by the adjudicators. There is widespread criticism that the Panels 
address the evidence in the most informal way. May be international law is liberal on this 
issue, but the multiplicity of issues infesting world trade calls for more attention of 
dispute settlement mechanism of WTO on evidentiary matters of trade related inter-state 
disputes.   
4.2. Importance of Evidentiary Law in WTO 
WTO dispute settlement system address the inter-state dispute having the onerous and 
visionary job of fact finding in an objective manner. In this fact finding mission 
evidentiary laws/rules play the role of pioneer as issues relating to evidence gained much 
importance and significance in settlement of international dispute. For WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism evidentiary law is more important than international criminal court. 
Because, it deals with political as well as economic interest of a sovereign body politic.  
Legitimacy and effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanism of WTO also oscillate 
around- to a large extent- how the adjudicators deal with evidentiary issues. Mishandling 
of evidentiary issues will lead to misjudgment which will consequently discourage the 
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member states to come to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The far reaching 
effect is the disruption, if not demolition, of the predictability of the world trading system. 
For enforcement of the substantive laws of WTO the auxiliary role of evidentiary rule has 
got paradigm shift to pivotal role as because subject matter scope of trade dispute has 
widened as well as become complicated further by comprehensive set of rights and 
obligations of the parties.                
4.3. Evolution of Evidentiary Laws - From GATT to WTO 
Dispute settlement mechanism under WRO regime has got a paradigm shift from the 
dispute settlement system of GATT. One may reasoned that during GATT trade disputes 
were only all about trade in goods. Obviously there are other reasons. The legal 
perspectives and imperatives of dispute resolution mechanism in GATT was quiet absent. 
Amicable settlement to reap a political consensus was the prima donna. The Panels did 
not face complex evidentiary matters due to the reality that most disputes before Panels 
did not unravel ramification of issues related to proof. After 1994 the world trade scenario 
has changed outright. Visible & invisible, tangible & intangible, physical & intellectual as 
well as from low-profile to high-profile goods and services have been subjected to the 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
The decisions of the Panel and AB become obligatory for the parties to a dispute after 
adoption by the DSB. However, Member not a party to the said dispute is not under any 
legal binding of any decision of the system. Nor subsequent cases are under binding 
interpretations of previous cases. Nonetheless, the Panel and AB are at liberty to rely on 
reasoning of the past reference. In fact, though the WTO regime is not precedence base, 
the Panel and AB try to adhere to the interpretations established by precedents. But un-
adopted report has no legal status either for the Panel or AB. In its report on Argentina – 
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Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items the AB 
criticized the Panel for relying heavily on past GATT practice saying that –“ in our report 
in Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, we agreed with the Panel that ‘un-adopted’ 
panel reports have no legal status in the GATT or WTO system …., although we believe 
that a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an un-adopted 
panel report that it considered to be relevant.”55     
WTO members by signing the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization have captivated them to a more legalistic and formal rule based codified 
dispute settlement system that was not evident during GATT era. Trade rules under WTO 
are deepened and broad based. The measures at issues before the Panel, that is the 
subject-matters of dispute have emerged to be complex and diversified that necessitates 
the Panel to pay exert exhaustive attention to contentious facts and adduced evidence. 
Nonetheless, DSU containing the formal set of rules and procedures are not complete 
whole to cover all issues relating to the evidence. Hence the adjudicators shoulder more 
responsibility to address the complex issues of evidence to maintain the predictability of 
world trade. Here it is important to note that the AB- in absence of complete set of law of 
evidence- plays the role of doyen to constitutionalize different evidentiary issues not 
touched upon by WTO jurisprudence. 
4.4. Sources of Law of Evidence for Dispute Settlement Mechanism of WTO 
The sources of evidentiary laws for dispute settlement mechanism may be discussed from 
the view point of primary sources, secondary sources and tertiary sources. Being 
constitutional law, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes and the covered agreements can be enumerated as primary sources. The 
                                           
55 WT/DS56/R, AB Report on 11 March 1998. 
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understanding is also called the DSU which is the brain-child of the WTO legislators. 
This common understanding is supposed to be all inclusive, coordinated and explicit. But 
interestingly, like other international laws DSU lacks technical and procedural details 
about evidentiary matters. Numbers of covered agreements have some specific rules on 
different aspects of evidentiary matters. The problem is that these specific rules have no 
generic value; rather these are issue specific.   However, some covered agreements have 
expressed obligation on certain issues of evidence. These are discussed below;    
[I] Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 or Anti-dumping Agreement. The obligations under this agreement are;   
a)Article 3.4- Impact assessment of dumping shall include all relevant economic factors 
and indices having bearing on the state of the industry. 
b) Article 3.5- Causal relationship between dumping and injury shall be based on an 
examination of all relevant evidence before the authority including other known factors 
than imports causing injury.    
c) Article 3.7-Threat of material injury is to be determined based on facts and merely on 
allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. 
d) Article 10.7- Deals with the sufficiency of evidence. 
e) Annex II- para 1- The investigating authority can rely on facts available if the 
information is not supplied within reasonable time. 
f) Annex II- para 3 – Requires that during determination are made, verifiable, 
appropriately submitted, timely supplied shall be taken into account.  
g)Annex II- para 5- If the information providing party makes best endeavor, investigating 
authority cannot disregard the information not ideal in all respect . 
h) Annex II- para 6- Supplying party should be informed forthwith of reasons therefore 
and be given an opportunity to supply other evidence if the prior information is not 
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accepted.   
[II]Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures- 
Article 4.2- Requested for consultation should be supported by statement of available 
evidence on existence and nature of subsidy. 
Article 11- Application by domestic industry for investigation shall  
includes sufficient evidence on subsidy , injury and causal link. 
Article 12- It details evidentiary matters on countervailing duty.  
Annex V- Laid down the procedures for developing information  
concerning serious prejudice. 
[III] Agreement on Safeguards: a) Article 4:2:a- In investigation all  
relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature must be evaluated. 
b) Article 3:1- Application of safeguard measure must be in the public interest and a 
report on findings and reasoned conclusions made on all pertinent issues of fact and law 
shall be published.     
c) Article 4:1:b – Determination of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and 
not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. 
d) Article 4:2:b – Causal link between injury and increased import must be based on 
objective evidence. 
Apart from the above three notable covered agreements, other agreements like Agreement 
on Custom Valuation, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agreement on 
Pre-shipment Inspection and Agreement on Textile and Clothing incorporated some 
obligations concerning evidentiary matters. The gap in WTO jurisprudence regarding 
different issues of is the potential source of moral hazard problem when grey area is 
eminent. Inherent power of the court deemed to a tentative solution. One may raise the 
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question whether inherent power of the court could be given the same status of 
constitutional laws. But there is no denial to the fact that inherent power is 
complementing the constitutional laws. Inherent power is exercised if and only when it is 
necessary for exercising jurisdiction of the court provided that such exercise of power 
does not antagonize the object and purpose of the treaty establishing the said court. In 
international law the practice developed by a court under the doctrine of inherent power is 
transferred to another court with similar jurisdiction. Generally accepted principles and 
customary international laws are another main two significant sources for international 
law on evidence. 
As far as secondary source is concerned, judge-made laws are also recognized in WTO 
jurisprudence. Article 17(9) of the DSU has empowered the AB to develop working 
procedure. In addition case law emanates through decisions of the Panel & AB are also 
vital source in WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The AB bridges the gap/lacuna 
created by or in-built in WTO jurisprudence on evidentiary issues and thus 
constitutionalize the same. From critical viewpoint, there is danger of filling the gap by 
case law. Over-exercise of case law gradually and slowly makes the main law incomplete. 
In such a case, judges raise them to the role of legislators leaving a chance of judicial 
activism. It invites co-ordination problems for the future thus constraining future 
decisions due to inconsistency in explanation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. Evidentiary Matters & WTO Court Proceedings 
5.1. Prima Face Evidence and Burden of Evidence 
Prima face evidence may be defined as evidence sufficient to deduce a reasonable belief 
regarding the truthfulness of the claim in a dispute provided that no counter evidence is 
adduced. In common law system, once the prima face case is made the complainant is 
relieved of providing further evidence. This means that he/she has discharged the burden 
of evidence and enough is done in favor of his/her claim. The opponent party bears the 
risk of being given adverse judgment if he/she fails to produce any/ some rebuttal 
evidence. Making prima face case off course and does not necessarily bring an end to the 
dispute simply as because discharging burden of evidence is not akin to discharging 
burden of proof. 
As far as prima face issue is concerned, the doctrine of WTO dispute settlement system is 
that burden of proof as well as burden of evidence shift to the other party. In WTO 
jurisprudence once a prima face case is established and the opponent produce some 
rebuttal evidence the Panel has to examine all available evidence as a whole. That is, 
fragmentation or choose & pick of evidence is highly disregarded if not prohibited. 
Totality of evidence is a corollary in the Panel proceeding of WTO.    
5.2. Burden of Evidence vis a vis Rule of Collaboration 
Adjudicators of dispute settlement system of WTO base their decision on all available 
evidence rather than on best available evidence. No doubt the dispute settlement system 
of WTO is participatory one and the adjudicators have the responsibility of objective 
assessment of fact. More so, WTO jurisprudence allows flexibility in producing evidence, 
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mode of evidence and means of making submission. All these flexibilities are meant for 
sustaining the security and predictability of world trading system. While the Panel 
assumes the onerous responsibility, the parties to the dispute are not enjoying laissez faire 
on the issue of providing the Panel with all the relevant facts and evidence on the disputed 
issue. This entails the duty of collaboration to unravel the truth which eventually helps 
both the parties. This rule of collaboration does not however free the parties from 
discharging the burden of evidence and burden of proof.   
The obligation of collaboration is reinforced in Argentina-Textile obliging that the parties 
to the dispute are duty bound to collaborate in providing the Panel with evidence and 
facts kept in sole possession of such party. Argentina’s refusal to produce documents 
requested by USA led the Panel make an observation that parties in an international 
dispute have a duty to “collaborate” in terms of providing evidences that are in sole 
possession of either party as there is “no discovery system in international proceedings”.56 
Such sort of refusal results in panel’s discretion to draw adverse inference against party so 
refusing.57
&58 
5.3. Discovery of Evidence and Panel’s Right to Seek Information  
Broad, comprehensive and discretionary right is conferred on the Panel in Article 13 of 
the DSU to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which it 
seems proper and just. To examine factual issues relating to scientific or other technical 
matters raised by any party advisory report from an expert review group may be sought 
by the Panel. Appendix 4 of the DSU goes on details empowering the Panel as to 
selection of independent experts, setting terms of reference for the expert and the manner 
                                           
56 Argentina-Textile,Panel Report. Para 6.40 of 
57 Related case- Canada-Aircraft. Moreover DSU Article 3.10 also related 
58, WT/DS70/AB/R,  AB Report,p aras 202 et seq.   
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by which the opinions will be handed over to the parties. 
Article 13.1 allows an unconditional right to the Panel to obtain information from parties 
to a dispute. This right is important in international dispute settlement process because 
there no ‘discovery system in international proceedings’. It means that, probably all 
international system of dispute resolution including WTO lacks the authority to collect 
evidence by act of policing. Similarly, WTO has no investigation mechanism or 
investigating authority.  Hence, making request for information can serve the purpose of 
collecting evidence indirectly. This right of the Panel is reinforced by the provision laid 
down in third sentence of the Article 13.1 which goes on as ‘A Member should respond 
promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such information as the panel considers 
necessary and appropriate.’ The AB ruling has furthered this right imparting legal 
obligation on the parties to provide the information sought for by the Panel. 59  Non-
compliance by a party of the request means non collaboration and such refusal to submit 
information results in obvious negative/adverse inference by the Panel.60 In fact, the Panel 
has high latitude to interpret the factual matter to the disfavor of the very non-cooperating 
Member.    
5.4. Relevancy of Evidence and the Panel’s Stance 
It is discussed time and again that the Panel has wider range of authority to seek 
information from any sources. Similarly, the Panel is at liberty to fix up the need for 
evidence and advice in specific case. This authority is stretched to deciding the relevancy 
of evidences. In the practice of dispute settlement system of WTO, this general rule is 
developed and so far the parties are not objecting to this de facto authority of the Panel. 
The Panel’s broad discretion on determining the relevancy of evidence, admitting 
                                           
59 Canada- Aircraft, The AB Report, para 188 & 189 
60 Id, para 198-203 
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evidence and arguments is dispute specific. In US- Shirts and Blouses the AB found that 
the Panel can consider any type of evidence.
61
 Here again we see ad hocism. But this ad-
hocism is well established in WTO jurisprudence. But court’s discretion on this issue has 
in-built limitation. First off all this may cause ignorant biasness among the adjudicators. 
Secondly, adjudicators from different law system may be in trouble in fixing, determining 
relevancy and admitting evidence. Needless to say, there is no domestic law lacking clear 
cut laws on relevancy of evidence and admission of evidence.  
The relevancy of evidence even not limited to the prima face of a case. Here comes the 
question of exclusion of evidence. In EC-Bed Linen the Panel did not exclude the 
evidence brought from consultation based on the argument that the evidences were 
unnecessary or irrelevant. The Panel opined that evidence from consultations is at best 
unnecessary and might be irrelevant. In fact, the Panel opted not to over-step the 
legitimate right of the party on adducing evidence in the pretext of irrelevancy of 
evidence. 
5.5. Confidentiality of Evidence 
While discussing evidentiary aspect, issues related to confidentiality is very much 
common as well in dispute settlement process of WTO. As per Article 14.1 and 17.10 
both the Panel and Appellate Board process themselves confidential. So it makes sense 
that the information supplied to this process is also confidential as well. Article 13.1 
provisioned that confidential information provided to the Panel shall not be made public 
without prior permission of supplying authority. Similarly written submission submitted 
to the process, Panel’s deliberation and documents submitted to Panel and information 
provided to/by the Expert Review Group are confidential. At the end of both the 
                                           
61 The AB’s finding was referred by the Panel in US-Shrimp, para 7.14 
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processes arguments made by parties and reasoning of the Panel are subject to disclosure 
in the form of reports, except information termed as secret or confidential by the supplier 
country. In fact, while the decision of a particular case has no binding effect on other 
members (members not party to the very case); so they have no moral right to step into 
the secrecy of contesting parities.  
5.6. Remand System and Evidentiary Issues 
WTO jurisprudence does not allow the AB to send back certain cases to the Panel for 
conducting retrial for insufficient findings by Panel. It has two conflicting aspects. On the 
one hand, it is time-saving while on the other hand chance is there that some issues might 
remain unresolved because of insufficient factual findings by Panel. However there are 
other pros and cons of the remand authority. The remand issue is more important because 
as per 17.14 of the DSU the report of the AB will be adopted by the DSB automatically 
unless DSB decides unanimously otherwise. So, time has come to reconsider this issue.  
In absence of remand authority the AB in the name of ‘completing the analysis’ will 
bridge the missing gap left out by the Panel. This practice has been developed by the AB 
per se over the years. It is tantamount to re-adjudication by the AB. It is not clear, why the 
legislators did not consider this remand power. The technique called ‘completing the 
analysis’ eventually withering out the benefit of time saving. For instance, after 
invocation DRAMS case continued for more than two years; but no recommendation was 
made by the AB. This case animated huge debate. The Panel failed to make proper 
analysis on evidentiary matters. Failure of the panel left the obligation for the AB to 
complete the legal analysis. But ironically, AB was unable to do so notwithstanding the 
fact that AB on many issues reversed the Panel. The case was not remanded to the Panel 
for further adjudication for the obvious reasons. 
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5.7. Circumstantial Evidence 
Circumstantial evidences have to do with motive and preparation including previous and 
subsequent conduct or act of either party. Circumstantial evidence explains what moved 
or influenced the mind and whether being thus seduced any preparation was moved 
followed by premeditated action. While dealing with circumstantial evidence motive is 
significant unless evidence is cogent, clear and reliable. Circumstantial evidences are 
indirect evidence as these do not go directly to the facts in issue. Rather these allow 
inference or assumptions. Nonetheless, consistency of circumstantial evidences is enough 
to make a justifiable legal conclusion built on accumulation of evidence. Circumstantial 
evidence may be stretched from state economic/fiscal/financial policy to distant 
implication of the policy. For example in US-Countervailing Duty Investigation of 
DRAMS  the allegations were (a)that the Government of Korea by its policy support 
prevented the failure of HYNIX;(b) that GOK controlled the creditors of HYNIX this 
way or that; (c) GOK’s coercion of those creditors; and (d) a prospectus filed by two 
Korean banks to US Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Analysis of circumstantial evidences is to be done on the basis of totality of evidences. 
Determination of the case is to be based on the cumulative result of the evidences. AB in 
the said case stated above found that evidence that fell short of the required level by itself 
would be added with similar piece of evidence to reach accumulative total.
63
  
5.8. Economic Evidence and Expert Opinion 
The Panel’s inalienable right to invite expert opinion is recognized by the lawmakers in 
the DSU. It makes sense for some economic evidence as economic determinations are 
now essential in today’s trade dispute. Certain trade disputes need high profile specialist 
economic input. For example dispute having the compulsion of determining like, directly 
                                           
62 US-Countervailing Duty Investigation of DRAMS, Panel Report,   paras. 7.51 
63 US-Countervailing Duty Investigation of DRAMS, AB Report, paras. 142, 143 
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competitive or substitute products needs expert opinion regarding price and cross 
elasticity of demand. Injury determination in trade protection cases as well as causality 
determination requires use of econometrics and partial equilibrium model. Economic 
assessment is needed as well in the cases on balance of payment measures. Economic 
assessment is to be substantiated by the economic evidences.  
In trade disputes requiring economic assessment expert opinion does not necessarily 
always serve all the purpose of objective assessment. It virtually adds decision input for 
the adjudicators. To ensure the prima face regarding the objectiveness & un-bias of the 
expert evolution, the Panel must assess the economic evidences to be adduced in support 
of the assessment. For example, in the case titled India-Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agriculture, Textile and Industrial Products the Panel on its own made final 
economic determination side by side with the external advices. 
5.9. Adducing New Evidence at Appellate Stage 
It will not be exaggerated if we say that WTO regime is silent as to whether new evidence 
is allowed during appeal or at appellate stage. The appeal is not a de novo hearing and it 
is a usual presumption that no new evidence will be admitted at appellate stage. But 
situation might be different if some evidence was not admitted by the Panel and Panel 
erred in law on evidentiary issues. 
As far as new arguments are concerned, in Canada- Aircraft, the AB found that ‘new 
arguments are not per se excluded from the scope of appellate review, simply because 
they are new’.64 Does it mean that ‘new argument’ in this case is truly new or can be 
raised for the first time? The answer is probably not. New arguments may be invited only 
when it has to do with the wrong reasoning of the Panel’ decision/legal interpretation of 
                                           
64 Canada Aircraft, The AB report, para 211 
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the Panel. 
5.10. Due Process vs Submission of Evidence  
Perhaps, due process is thought to be the life-blood of any legal system which ensures 
natural justice or fairness and provides a philosophical code of conduct for both the side - 
law makers and judges/juries. Law makers are closely concerned with substantive due 
process which deals with the fairness in law making process and law itself. And 
adjudicatory body is inseparably linked with procedural due process which addresses the 
issue of how reasonably and fairly the decision is evolved. For adjudicatory body the 
principal of due process tends to be more important as because absence of due process in 
law making may be corrected by judicial review being the last resort. But mistake in 
adjudicatory body has dire consequence, particularly on losing party. 
Due process in international legal system is extended or forwarded from domestic law. It 
has three facets- bias rule, hearing rule and no evidence rule. The core of ‘bias rule’ is the 
maxim nemo debet esse judex in roperia sua causa which means that no one can be a 
judge in his own cause. It necessitates that, decision making process should not leave any 
scope for a fair-minded people suspect or apprehend a bias in it. The ‘hearing rule’ 
emanates from the maxim audi alteram partem which means to hear the party in 
opposition. It imposed a compulsion to give reasonable and adequate notice of trial, 
allowing representation during hearing and ensuring access to the adverse materials. The 
‘no evidence rule’ deals with the rationale behind the decision itself. A decision must be 
fairly well-founded based on logically probative evidence and examination of all relevant 
aspects of facts and law, supported by adequate reasons and free from internal 
contradictions.   
The fundamental of the due process is evolved from the requirements laid down in Article 
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11 of DSU which says inter alia  
‘‘…Accordingly, a Panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it…. 
Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate 
opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.’’65  
Article 13 empowers the Panels the right to seek information and technical advice from 
any body or individual which it think proper. This article allows the Panel as well to seek 
information from any relevant sources and consult experts to obtain their opinion on 
certain aspects of the matter. By observing meticulously, it is found that to some extent a 
part of due process; that is the hearing rule is barred in DSU. This is clear from the 
labyrinth created from terms of reference, request for consultation and request for 
establishing panel is a major obstacle in ensuring hearing rule of due process. 
Interestingly, though the DSU empowers the panel to invite evidence, it is not clear when 
and in which manner the evidences will be collected. It is also not crystal clear whether 
the evidence collected by the Panel per se are subject to the concerned parties’ 
observations. In absence of such clear cut rules regarding it the chance of shattering the 
maxim of hearing rule of due process might be in jeopardy. The Panel as well as the AB 
is supposed to be animated meticulously on this issue. 
While discussing the evidence related matters the issue of weighing or testing the veracity 
of evidence comes forward. It is tough job for the Panel to weigh or judge the veracity of 
evidence specially coming in the form of the submission of the contested parties, expert 
opinions or materials presented by non-state actors like NGOs.       
Keeping in mind the shortcomings of the DSU regarding testing the veracity of evidence, 
right to adduce evidence and similar other issues, let us see how the three issues of due 
process are addressed in DSU while dealing with evidences. 
                                           
65 Article 11 of the DSU under the title ‘Function of Panel’ prescribed some mandatory tasks for the Panel while discharging its duty of assisting DSB. Any 
omission or error on these issues by the Panel would lead to a definite appeal.  
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Bias Rule in DSU: The issue of bias rule is addressed in DSU in the following manner: 
Article 18.1 – Prohibits ex- parte communication with adjudicatory body; 
Paragraph 10 of the Panel Working Procedure – Representations, rebuttals and statements 
are to be done in presence of the opposite parties. 
On top of these, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and  
Hearing Rule in DSU: The issue of hearing rule is addressed in the following manner in 
DSU; 
Article 12.6 and 15.1 – Written submissions to the Panel; 
Article 7 – Terms of Reference; 
Rule 20(2)(d) of Working Procedures for Appellate Review – Errors of the Panel must be 
made clear in the notice of Appeal; 
Rule 21 of Working Procedures for Appellate Review – Appellant must support its 
standing by arguments in written form. 
Article 15 of DSU, Rules 21,22 and 27 of Working Procedures for Appellate  Review – 
Opportunity of the parties to make comment, written submission as well as oral 
submission- where applicable- on the Panel and the AB’s draft report; 
Besides case laws also provides such rule for hearing which comprises opportunity to be 
heard, opportunity to represent at hearing and opportunity to respond to adverse evidence.  
No Evidence Rule in DSU: The issue of no evidence rule is addressed in the following 
way: 
Article 12.7 of DSU:- Findings and recommendation of the Panel to be based on basic 
rationale and the report of the Panel shall set out the finding of facts and the applicability 
of relevant provisions. 
Article 17.12 of DSU:- The AB shall address each of the contended issues covered in the 
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Panel report and legal interpretation developed by the Panel.  
5.11. Rules on Burden of Proof 
Burden of proof being procedural concept is a tool for the judge to assign the duty to 
prove factual claim. Needless to say, burden of proof is not at all relevant for legal issues 
or legal interpretation. Probably all jurisprudence – be it international or domestic- have 
the common cannon that a party asserting a fact must provide proof thereof. In other 
words, burden of proof or evidentiary responsibility goes with the party seeking any 
remedy, demanding any defense or exceptions and/or claiming any right. This universally 
accepted principal is also followed in WTO dispute settlement system and it seems that, 
for this reason DSU does not have any explicit provision regarding this. In United States 
Woven Blouse and Shirts the AB ruled that; 
‘…a generally accepted cannon of evidence in civil law, common law and in fact, of most 
jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rest upon the party, whether complainant or 
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defense.’66 
Thus, the burden of proof may be either on the complaining or defending party. Burden of 
proof is the base for assessing or weighing the evidence. The party having the burden of 
proof should adduce evidences to establish the prima face of a complaint. Once the prima 
face is made, the responding party has the onus to disprove the complaining party’s claim. 
So, the burden of proof under WTO is a two tier process 
Keeping the generally accepted principal of burden of proof as it is, some covered 
agreements also pointed out as to who bears the burden. For example, Article 10.3 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture states as: 
‘‘Any Member which claims that any quantity exported in excess of a reduction 
commitment level is not subsidized must establish that no export subsidy, whether listed 
in Article 9 or not, has been granted in respect of the quantity of export in question.’’ 
Similarly, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures placed the burden on 
                                           
66 WT/DS33/AB/R para 14 
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exporting country to show that its export qualifies importing countries sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards.67 GATT Article XXIV placed the burden on the respondent to 
show that formation of custom union would otherwise prevented in absence of measures 
at issues.
68
 Under Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures the claimant 
country has the burden of proof to show that the developing country fails to comply with 
the provisions of Article 27 of the same.  
The style of burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement system is much akin to 
inquisitorial system where written submission is predominating form of presenting 
evidence and deposition. Though the style of burden of proof in WTO is a combination of 
written submission, answer to written question and oral presentation, the oral deposition 
has secondary to the written submission. In fact, the prima face of a case is made on the 
written-work/paper-book. 
5.12. Rules on Standard of Review 
Standard of review of the panel process are equally important in WTO dispute settlement 
system inasmuch as Panels are reviewing the laws, regulations or measures of a sovereign 
political body. In domestic jurisprudence standard of review shows the distribution 
/division/ separation of power between judiciary and law-makers including bureaucracy. 
But in WTO dispute settlement system a question always comes in mind as to supremacy 
or subordination between WTO regime and domestic legislation.  
Standard of review indicates the answer to the question that to what extent or with what 
depth or intensity a Panel can review the Member’s laws to adjudicate the compliance of 
domestic regulations vis- a- vis WTO regime. Simultaneously, it delineates the degree of 
respect to be shown to Member’s sovereignty by the Panel. Under WTO dispute 
                                           
67 Article 4.1 and 6.3 of Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
68 Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, AB Report. 
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settlement system it is inherent that standard of review is mostly specific to WTO 
agreement and particular fact/circumstances. However in general, Article 11 of the DSU 
gives a broad guideline in this regard;  
‘…Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, 
including an objective assessment of facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements….’ 
In EC-Hormones the AB opined that the provisions laid down in the Article 3.2 and 11 of 
the DSU will be applicable in case any covered agreement does not have specific standard 
of review.
69
 The jargon ‘objective assessment’ is the buzzword for standard of review. It is 
neither de novo review, nor total deference.
70
 Regarding factual determination the 
jurisprudence come out of the case US-Cotton Yarn is a helpful summary of standard of 
review.
71
 According to the finding of the case, standard of review of facts is of two fold. 
First the Panel must assess whether competent authority of the Member examined all 
relevant facts and second, whether an adequate explanation is given for the facts in 
support of the determination.
72
  
On the other hand standard of review of WTO law seems to be less difficult. Usually it is 
de novo standard. Perspective of Vienna Convention is a ready guideline towards this end. 
Side by side, giving adequate/just deference to the Member’s own factual findings or 
interpretation of legal aspect, specially interpretation of domestic legislation, is also a 
generally accepted practice. However, generally intrusive review-standard does not 
entails any accurate/exact yardstick or appropriate methods of interpretation. Hence, 
proper interpretation of WTO regime is crucial and debatable issue in most disputes. In 
Argentina-Footwear (EC) the AB found the standard of review of WTO regime as; 
‘In addition to “an objective assessment of the facts”, we note too, that part of the 
“objective assessment of the matter” required of the panel by Article 11 of the DSU is an 
                                           
69 EC-Hormones, AB Report, para 116 
70 Id, para 117. 
71 US-Cotton Yarn, AB Report, para 74 
72 id 
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assessment of “the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. 
Consequently, we must also examine whether the Panel correctly interpreted and applied 
the substantive provisions of Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguard.’73 
Here the compulsion imposed to the Panel is making ‘correct interpretation’ of the WTO 
provisions in question. Rather than allowing deference to the interpretation made by 
Member on WTO laws, emphasis is put on allowing de novo interpretation by the 
disputed parties. In fine, for both the Panel and the AB de novo standard of review of 
WTO regime is recognized widely.  
Apart from the general standard some covered agreements have in-built special standard. 
For instance, Article 17.6 of Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) adduced the issue both for 
factual and legal aspect. For factual determination the said Article put forward the 
standard for Panel to judge whether the authorities’ establishment of facts was proper and 
whether unbiased and objective evaluation of those facts was done. For legal issues, it is 
emphasized that interpretation of relevant provisions of the ADA shall be made keeping 
conformity with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. In case 
where more than one permissible interpretation are allowed in ADA, the onus of the Panel 
is to examine the measures to be inconformity with the ADA if the same is subject to one 
of those permissible interpretations. 
Article 11 of the DSU, Article 17.6 of the ADA and the review by the AB provides an 
appropriate and well-founded standard of review for the Panel. But for the AB the 
standard of review seems not to be same as the Panel. Because, the AB is not concerned 
with factual issues of a dispute In this regard the AB depends on its own reasoning and 
interpretation. The jurisdiction of the AB is wider here.  
                                           
73 Argentina – Footwear (EC), The AB Report, para122 
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5.13. Standard of Proof 
National criminal justice system put the responsibility on the party pressing for or 
asserting a claim to prove the asserted claim beyond any reasonable doubt. However, 
fixing the standard of proof is a great challenge for many international courts. The ICJ 
follows the default rule of “clear and convincing evidence”. Interestingly, WTO dispute 
settlement system observes some sort of detachment from other international courts. The 
different means in-built in WTO jurisprudence is that, at first, the complaining party has 
to establish the prima face case and once the prima face is established the presumption 
goes in favor of its claim. Then the floor is open for the opposite party to rebut this 
presumption. Nonetheless, the rout is not that much smooth for the Panel as there is no 
categorical rule for standard of proof to establish the prima face and to determine as to the 
type and amount of evidence to make a presumption of truth. In such situation, 
‘preponderance of evidence’ or ‘balance of evidence’ is the operational toll for the 
adjudicators. 
5.14. Probative Value of Evidence 
Assessment of evidence by the international courts is neither subjected to strict procedure 
nor governed by formal rules. Neutrality and reliability are the two main components of a 
particular evidence to measure its influence in proving a fact. In fact, in absence of 
scientific or economic yardstick, parameters to determine the probative value of each & 
every evidence have been developed through yearlong practice in international courts. 
WTO dispute settlement system is not an exception to this. The adjudicators of the Panel 
have to consider all available evidence. But the Panel has the discretion as to assign the 
probative value to the individual piece of evidence produced by the contesting parties.  
Here it is worthwhile to discuss the probative value of evidence collected by the experts 
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who are appointed by the Panel per se. By appointing expert, the Panel virtually evolves 
as inquisitor and it is arguable to note that the Panel will certainly own experts opinion 
and may assign high probative value to it. This will, off course, change the composition 
of the evidences. In fact, the inquisitorial role of the Panel in the guise of seeking 
information may seduce the Panel to be selective regarding evidence and this chance to 
pick and choose evidence is a potential field of distortion of evidence that may seduce 
potential for affecting the objective assessment. Against the backdrop of two set of 
evidence - one set coming from the parties while other is coming from the experts 
appointed by the Panel - the adjudicators have definite role to prevent the chance of 
distortion of evidence. One possible way is not to give the expert opinion much breathing 
space. Rather filtering the opinion and allowing the parties to raise their opinion could be 
a tentative solution to ensure participator dispute settlement.  
Discussion on probative value of evidence also calls for mode of presentation of evidence. 
In Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparels and Other 
Items’ the panel found that submission of copies of custom documents instead of original 
did not affect the probative value of evidence.
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5.15. Evaluation of Evidences 
International legal jurisprudence knowingly or inadvertently allows by tradition much 
discretion for the judges in evaluating and assessing the probative value of evidence. But 
nowadays, situation is different. The courts are now more cautious and sensitive as to the 
base of reasoning of their decision though there is no agreed upon formal rules to ascribe 
particular weight/value to a particular piece of evidence. WTO jurisprudence as well did 
not provide any constitutional mechanism for evaluation of evidence. Hence, judges have 
                                           
74 Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparels and Other Items Panel Report, Para 6.58  
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to depend on the secondary procedural laws developed mostly by the AB. 
Article 11 of the DSU provides only review standard mandating, inter alia, that the Panel 
“should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case…………’’ This standard is very general and subjective 
in nature. It seems that the Panel has much authority to make a value judgment on the 
standard set by the DSU. But, the Panel cannot make any de novo investigation. In US-
Countervailing Duty Investigation of DRAMS case the AB found that, a Panel acts ‘as a 
reviewer of agency action, rather than as an initial trier of fact”.75 Other instruments for 
evaluation of evidences are concept of totality, accuracy & reliability and supportive 
features of evidence towards inference/presumptions.      
5.16. Presentation of Evidence 
Like any other judicial system the measure at issue in dispute settlement system of DSU 
is mostly determining the production, admissibility and sufficiency of evidence. If the 
dispute is all about violation of WTO laws, the measure at issue is simply the legislative 
provisions. Here mere production of the copy of the laws/regulations initiated by the 
respondent Member constitutes the admissible and sufficient evidence which is nothing 
but documentary in nature. But if the dispute is fact-sensitive, situation is more complex 
and delicate for the matters related to ‘factual evidence’ and ‘rebuttal evidence’. The main 
reason is that, WTO jurisprudence does not have substantial body of rules outlining 
admissibility, submission, weight and sufficiency of evidence. In the absence of 
categorical technical rules concerning evidence, it seems that the parties as well as the 
Panels are enjoying latitude to a great extent. This sort of flexibility is present in other 
international courts like International Court of Justice simply because harmonized 
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 US-Countervailing Duty Investigation of DRAMS, AB Report, para.188.s 
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international evidence law is yet to be promulgated in international legal system. 
Harmonization of technical issues of evidentiary rules is relevant also because in 
international court/tribunal as well adjudication depends on assumption, presumption, 
induction, deduction and inference. WTO jurisprudence as well admitted the flexibility in 
Article 12.2 of the DSU allowing panel procedure to provide sufficient flexibility to 
ensure high quality panel report without unduly delaying panel process.   
The lacuna regarding codified evidentiary rules results in discretionary power to the 
adjudicatory body and parties to the trade dispute are in limbo to best serve their claims 
and objectives. This happens because adversarial and inquisitorial model of trial deal 
with evidentiary issues quite differently. Common law system weigh evidence taking into 
consideration the prejudicial value and probative value and parties cannot be selective on 
relevancy of evidence. Under civil law system parties are enjoying latitude as to the 
relevancy of evidence and court play more instructive role in presentation of evidence. 
But WTO literature is not clear which system the Panels will follow. Further complexity 
arises when parties are from two different family of legal system. For example, in 
Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles Apparels and Other Items 
Argentina raised objection on accepting copy of certain documents instead of originals. 
But the Panel ruled that submission of copies of original documents did not affect the 
probative value of evidence.
76
  
5.17. Means of Evidence and Deposition 
Like other international procedural jurisprudence DSU also lacks of all exhaustive list of 
means of evidence. Among the different means of evidence documentary evidence, of 
course predominates in WTO dispute settlement system. Simultaneously, there is no 
hierarchy of different evidences. Rather, the adjudicators judge the evidentiary value of 
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each & every evidence. Any type of evidence- it direct or indirect, documentary or oral, 
primary or secondary – can play a crucial role in determining a case. Like domestic legal 
system neither DSU, nor the Panel or the AB requires anybody representing the state to 
give testimony as the documents produced by them are subject scrutiny by the 
adjudicators. Even the expert opinion of independent body like NOGs is subject to 
evaluation by the Panel. However, amicus curiae brief, to some extent, has more legal 
footings in WTO dispute settlement mechanism when the adjudicators face the questions 
of legal interpretation of factual or legal information.  
Inspection by the adjudicators themselves to discover evidences is not exercised in WTO 
dispute settlement system. However, court can get it done by the independent body in the 
form of expert opinion which is legalized by the Article 12.1. But this mechanism is 
extremely limited to scientific issues or issues related to econometrics led economic 
evidence. Written witness statement or affidavit is also not in use, although DSU is silent 
on using this. 
5.18. Time Limit for Submission of Evidence 
It is not exaggerated to say that there is no strict deadline for submission of evidence. 
Either the Article 12 of the DSU outlining panel procedure or Working Procedure for the 
Panels prescribes no defined sunset rule regarding time limit for production of evidence. 
Working Procedures for Panels (WPP)
77
 requires factual evidence to be submitted before 
the 1
st
 substantive meeting of the Panel and rebuttal evidence to be submitted in 2
nd
 
substantive meeting. In Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles 
Apparels and Other Items the Panel allowed USA to submit some evidence 2 days before 
the 2
nd
 substantive meeting and granted Argentina only 14 days to respond. The AB ruled 
that Working Procedures for Panels does not have any strict deadlines for submission of 
                                           
77 Appendix 3 of DSU, Paragraph 4,5 & 7 
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evidence.
78
 
Similar story was replicated in the case of Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Salmon. The case had the issue of belated production of evidence after the last meeting 
of the Panel. The debate was furthered animated as the Panel did not go by its own 
deadline for submission of evidence. Furthermore, the belated evidences were not 
excluded as well. The AB reinforced the flexibility of the Panel as to the time limit for 
submission of evidence to bring forth high quality reports.  
In the wake of legal limbo created for the absence of technical rules on evidentiary 
matters in WTO system, principals and practices of public international law can show the 
way. The widely accepted principal is allowing discretionary power to the adjudicators 
and the values and rules emerged from the practice of such discretionary power. The 
ethical standard for the adjudicators for such discretionary practice is obviously the 
principal of ‘due process’. In Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles 
Apparels and Other Items the Panel found, in part, that:- 
“We note that the rules of procedures of the panels do not prohibit the practice of 
submitting additional evidence after the first hearing of the Panel. Until the WTO 
Members agree on different and more specific rules on this regard, our main concern is to 
ensure that ‘due process’ is respected and that all parties to a dispute are given all the 
opportunities to defend their position to the fullest extent possible….”79   
The due process problem arising out of belated and new evidence was addressed by the 
AB in the Salmon case right way. The AB found that, in the absence of defined rules on 
production of evidence, the due process must nevertheless be observed. Here it is 
interesting to note that ICJ is also very lenient on the issue of new evidence and 
arguments and the court is at liberty to allow the opposite party reaction time for the 
belated and newly produced evidences.  
                                           
78 WT/DS56/R, The Appellate Body Report, para 77-81. 
79 WT/DS56/R, The Panel Report, para 6.55 
51 
 
Another standard for the Panel is the ‘responsibility to make the objective assessment of 
the matter and facts’ as laid down in the Article 11 of the DSU. In Korea – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverage the AB endorsed the discretionary power of the Panel regarding the 
examination and weighing of evidence as the trier of facts and found that a panel’s 
discretion in this regard “is not, of course, unlimited.” In line with its findings in EC – 
Hormones, the Body further ruled that such discretion is always subject to, and is 
circumscribed by, inter alia ,the Panel’s duty to ensure an objective assessment of the 
matter under Article 11 of the DSU.
80
 
5.19. Responsibility of the Parties as to Production of Evidence 
International laws are promulgated on the basis of consensus among the nation states. 
This consensus results in principal of co-operation and good-faith. This good-faith and 
co-operation are useful principals for evidentiary matters as well in international 
adjudication system. The non-cooperation gives the opportunity for making adverse 
inference. More so, though the Panel has the right to seek information under the Article 
13 of the DSU, the Panel cannot force or compel any party to provide information. In 
Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles Apparels and Other Items, 
Argentina’s refusal to produce documents requested by USA led the Panel make an 
observation that parties in an international dispute have the duty to collaborate in 
providing evidences that are in sole possession of either party as there is no discovery 
system in international proceedings.
81
 Such refusal results in Panel’s discretion to draw 
adverse inference against party so refusing.
82
 Apart from this de facto adverse inference, 
another option is opened for panel which is ‘facts available’ or ‘best available 
information’ principal. The Panel can depend on facts available in making its fact-finding. 
                                           
80 WT/DS75,84/AB/R, The AB Report, para 159-162 
81 WT/DS56/R, The Panel Report, para 6.40 
82 Related Case- Canada - aircraft 
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Among the facts available information, newspaper article and media reports can be used. 
The principal of good faith among the Members in WTO system is recognized in the 
Article 3.10 of the DSU. The corollary that Members will act in good-faith reduced the 
necessity of technical rules for evidentiary matters. The very maxim of good-faith 
imparted a responsibility on the Members to act reasonably and responsibly as well. 
Hence the question of authenticity of evidence is not a debatable issue in WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
5.20. Sufficiency of Evidence 
It is obvious that, the Panel is at liberty in admitting and evaluating the evidence. Such 
liberty raises the question regarding sufficiency of evidence. In other words, it is big ask 
as to how much evidences are needed to establish a prima face case. In Argentina- 
Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles Apparels and Other Item United States 
produced evidence on only 118 tariff categories out of alleged 940 tariff categories. That 
is, out of 940 tariff lines, Argentina collected excess duties in case of 118 tariff lines for 
textile and apparel products. Argentina argued that, if the collected tariff on remaining 
tariff lines were examined, the overall tariff rate had not exceeded the maximum level of 
bound rate in Argentina’s Schedule. The Panel opined that the US had adduced sufficient 
evidence to establish the prima face case as Argentina did not provide any affirmative 
evidence to the contrary. This finding of the Panel was upheld by the AB. The Panel is at 
latitude as to decide the sufficiency of evidence. In US Shirts and Blouses, the AB found 
inter alia, ”…………The Panel can reach their decision regarding a particular claim on 
the basis of the level of evidence which they consider sufficient.”.83Furthermore, how 
much evidence is needed to reinforce the presumption is also contingent upon and will 
                                           
83 The AB’s observation was referred by the Panel in US-Shrimp, para 7.14” 
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vary from case to case, measure to measure, provision to provision.  
The case-law jurisprudence discussed above shows that, in absence of any affirmative 
evidence to the contrary, sufficiency of evidence can be determined basing on the 
reliability of information. Nonetheless, this discretion of the Panel is approximated by the 
fact the Panel must take into account all the available evidences to ensure objectivity of 
their decision.   
This necessity of ensuring sufficiency of evidence does not necessarily put the Panel 
under compulsion to seek information or expert opinion in each dispute. Virtually, the 
power divulged in the Article 13 to seek information by the Panel is unconditional ant it is 
the right for the Panel which entails that Panel would exercise this right on its own so that 
it can reach an unbiased and objective decision.  
5.21. Third Parties and Unsolicited evidence 
Article 13 of the DSU empowers the Panel to invite information from any appropriate 
individual or body. Article 12.1 of the DSU allows departure from Working Procedure. 
Article 10.2 of the DSU prescribed that any member having a substantial interest in the 
matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB shall have an opportunity 
to be heard by the panel and to make written submission to the panel. Against the 
backdrop of the provisions of the Article 10.2, 12.1 & 13 of DSU, one may draw a logical 
deduction that production of evidence by the third party not at the instance of the panel is 
admissible.  
Interesting to note further that, whether any party having no trade interest at all may have 
an opportunity to produce evidences under the veil of Article 12.1 & 13 of DSU. If the 
Panel on its own seeks information from such party for making objective assessment the 
situation is different. But, what if, a stranger comes forward with very relevant 
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information. Say for example Country ‘X’ & ‘Y’ are contesting in a particular case and in 
halfway of the case an NGO comes with some information that might be necessary for 
objective assessment as well. This will definitely, inflict injury to the country against 
whom such information will go. Nonetheless, in absence of any categorized rules in DSU, 
lots depend on the particular circumstances and discretion of the Panel. For example, in 
the case titled Australia Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon and Australia Leather 
the Panel accepted unsolicited evidence. It seems holistic to some extent considering the 
noble intention of the legislator and adjudicators. 
The issue of addressing uncalled for evidence is legalized by the AB as well. In the case 
United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products evidence was 
submitted by NGOs having affiliation for environment. The Panel ruled out the evidence 
stigmatizing it as unsolicited. The Panel’s view was that Article 13 of the DSU did not 
make any express reference to the acceptance of such uncalled-for evidence. The AB 
reversed the Panel’s finding and thus advocated the Panel to accept unsolicited 
information. Here the AB considered the Panel’s right to make addition or departure from 
the Working Procedure of the DSU as stated in Article 12.1 of the DSU.
84
  
5.22. Delayed Evidence vis a vis Adverse Inference 
Article 12.2 allowed the panel process to be flexible for ensuring high quality panel report. 
Simultaneously this Article imposed a compulsion on the Panel to guard against unduly 
delaying panel process. The two issues of flexibility of panel process and unduly delaying 
panel process creates an antipathetic and conflicting situation for the adjudicators. 
However, these two issues are intertwined and inter-related, thus requiring to be read and 
judged inseparably. Hence, argument for absolute rule on exclusion of evidence submitted 
                                           
84 WTO Appellate Body Report, ‘United States – Import of Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,’ WT/DS58/R (‘Shrimp-turtle Appellate Body 
report’) and WTO Panel Report, ‘United States –Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,’ WT/DS58/R (‘Shrimp-turtle Panel report’). 
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by the complainant after first substantive meeting is not tenable. Similarly, Panel 
exercises judicial restraint in making adverse inference for delayed submission of 
evidence. Argument in favor of exclusion of evidence and thus resulting in adverse 
inference may hold water when the party adopts litigation technique to delay the panel 
Process. Till then, in absence of any sunset rule regarding the time limit of submission of 
new evidence after first substantive meeting, the process is complicated if the party 
adduce delayed new affirmative evidence which may be required for objective assessment.  
On the back of critical juncture discussed above, it is reasonable to seek prior permission 
by the party from the Panel for submission of new evidence after substantive meting 
promising a definite time frame. Again, the panel may notify a tolerable delay for 
submission of such new evidences and arguments. Because direct exclusion of delayed 
evidence may jeopardizes the neutrality of the Panel. Rather prudential guideline is more 
effective and well solicited. 
5.23. Evidence from Consultation Stage 
Article 13 of the DSU empowers the Panel to seek information from any sources it thinks 
appropriate. This is a grant discretionary authority given to the Panel to make an objective 
assessment as required in the Article 11 of the DSU. The investigative power of Article 13 
together with the onerous responsibility of Article 11 allows the Panel not to exclude 
evidence coming from consultation. Rather information garnered during consultation may 
help the complaining party to focus the subject matter of the case for which it seek 
establishment of the Panel. More so such information provides a guideline to the Panel 
for examination of measure at issue.    
Evidence emanating from consultation stage may adduce the debate of confidentiality. 
Article 4.6 states that “Consultation shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the 
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right of any Member in any further proceedings.” But this compulsion does not 
necessarily impose any restriction to the Panel to exclude evidence gathered from 
consultation. It makes sense, as because the measure at issue discussed in the consultation 
stage does not change in the Panel proceeding. More over same parties are involved in the 
consultation and the Panel Proceeding. Just the forum is different- in fact the Panel is the 
result of consultation fiasco.  
Another aspect to ponder on regarding evidences from consultation stage is that the Panel 
has to consider all available evidences for making decision, not the best available 
evidences. Judging the corollary of ‘all available evidence’ the Panel is neither in latitude 
to limit the facts and arguments nor to exclude evidences forward from consultation stage. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. Conclusion 
Dispute Settlement Understanding is the epicenter of international trade and thus the 
whole process of the system is supposed to be rule-based. The reality is that, conflict 
between the issues of state-sovereignty and establishing an international legal institution 
put the process in cross-road.  
WTO related laws are not isolated from other trade related international laws. Conflicting 
or cross rights and obligations are present as well as there are other regulatory bodies and 
laws on trade. Inclusion of other trade related international laws as covered agreement or 
allowing these cross-rights and cross-obligation has become an important consideration.  
As per Article 11 of DSU the buzzword before the Panel is the ‘objective assessment of 
the matter before it’. But the liberty of the Panel is not absolute or even not enough to 
uphold the objectivity of trial. Though, it as widely accepted that WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism is more articulated and rule based, till then, there is lacuna in procedural 
issues involved in different phase of the mechanism.  
WTO jurisprudence lacks a complete law of evidence; even a prudential guideline on this 
matter is absent. Some may argue that, other international courts also lack complete law 
on evidence. However, this argument is not tenable, inasmuch as there are very few 
supra-national court/tribunal where legislature passed in the parliament of a sovereign 
state is challenged. More so, decision of adjudicators not only affects the sovereignty, a 
defeat may even trigger domestic political crisis if a big industry is adversely affected. 
To address the gap caused by the absence of law on evidence, inherent power- to a great 
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extent- is a recognized solution. Side by side, procedural rules developed by other 
international tribunals are also necessary and widely practiced solution to this problem for 
courts of similar jurisdiction. Generally accepted principles, customary international laws, 
supportive literature like - secondary procedural laws developed during the court 
proceedings over the years by judges and case laws - are also widely recognized source of 
international evidentiary laws. These supportive literatures on evidentiary laws are 
supplementing the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO. Due to multiplicity and 
complex nature of trade interest of the disputed states time has come to develop a law on 
evidence for WTO legal system.  
WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides an international public good in the form of 
world government. Constituent substantive law of WTO may be in total jeopardy in 
absence of appropriate procedural law. Law on evidence is a beacon for the adjudicators 
seduced towards fact finding mission in an objective manner. For the contesting parties 
law of evidence is like a light-house. The informal/semi-formal way of handling the 
evidentiary issues or otherwise called ad-hocism is not conducive for sustainable, 
effective, efficient and equitable enforcement of substantive trade rules. 
Goods & service of both visible and invisible nature are now subject matter of case before 
the Panel. Hence, procedural decisions concerning evidence of GATT era play a very 
insignificant role in present days WTO dispute settlement mechanism. However, decision 
of GATT dispute settlement system may be used as a general interpretive guideline by the 
adjudicators. Interestingly, we presume that WTO regime is not precedence based as well. 
The Panel and the AB enjoys huge liberty in using precedence. This situation is created 
due to the absence of complete set of law of evidence. Proponent of the WTO system are 
kowtowing that to-days world trade is purely rule based while the reverse side of the 
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same coin is that WTO jurisprudence lacks even minimum rule on evidentiary matters if 
not no rules. Anyway, the AB plays the role of doyen to rescue the legal limbo in-built in 
WTO legal framework
85
. It will not be exaggerated if one argues that WTO dispute 
settlement system is plagued with the use of judge-made laws rendering the process 
vulnerable to the chance of judicial activism. Over-exercise of case laws and liberty of the 
adjudicators has a risk element of distorting the main law.  
Though Dispute Settlement Understanding lacks inclusive, coordinated technical and 
procedural details about evidentiary matters some covered agreements- not all- have 
expressed rules on certain issue of evidence. But these covered agreements provide 
case/issue specific solution. For example, as per Article 3.5 of Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Anti-
dumping Agreement, the causal relationship between dumping and injury shall be based 
on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authority including other known 
factors than imports causing injury. Equipping different covered agreements may be 
helpful for solving some specific and very technical/scientific evidentiary matters.  
WTO jurisprudence recognizes totality of evidence. Hence, making prima face does not 
obviously relieve the party making prima face once rebuttal evidence is produced. The 
corollary of using all available evidence results in the doctrine of collaboration among the 
parties in exchanging evidence. This collaboration ensures due process for the parties. 
This collaboration is vital also because WTO has no policing mechanism to discover 
evidence. Non-cooperation/non-collaboration means the guillotine of adverse inference. 
However- may be to avoid the situation arising out of adverse inference- the legislator of 
WTO gave the Panel huge discretionary authority to seek information from wide range of 
                                           
85 Judge-made laws are also recognized in WTO jurisprudence. For example Article 17(9) of the DSU has empowered the AB to develop working procedure. 
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source as per Article 13 of the DSU. This authority serve two purpose, the Panel can 
ensure the sufficiency evidence and a sovereign country can avoid a moral defeat from 
adverse inference. This unconditional authority vested to the Panel results in a dubious 
authority to fix up evidence, determining the relevancy of evidence and admitting 
evidence and arguments.  
WTO jurisprudence opted to maintain interesting confidentiality regarding evidence 
produced before the court. This so called secrecy may not be helpful for free, fair and 
open trial; but this rule demonstrates utmost respect to the secrecy of a sovereign state. 
Lack of remand system in WTO court system is also a thought provoking issue in support 
of promulgation of law of evidence. Like criminal case, circumstantial evidence has also 
a toll in today’s dispute settlement mechanism. For example in US-Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of DRAMS Korean Government’s policy support was treated as 
premeditated act to prevent the failure of HYNIX. Trade related evidence are becoming 
complex in nature as well as because some case requires high profile scientific or 
econometric analysis. Sometimes scientific/econometric assessment is to be 
corroborated/supported by scientific/economic evidence. WTO jurisprudence has no 
articulated rules on these issues. In this legal limbo, the Panels are using the given 
authority to seek information from the source they think proper. 
In a democratic society appellate court without remand power is impossible. But the AB 
of WTO is crippled- if not handicapped- in absence of remand power. No new evidence is 
allowed to be heard at appellate stage. Exclusion of evidence by the Panel makes the 
process further complicated. Though new argument at appellate stage is allowed, but it is 
not the exact substitute of remand power. So for objectivity and fairness of the trial the 
AB must be equipped with remand power.  
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Ensuring substantial due process is the back-bone of each judicial system. Both the law 
makers and the judges are involved in this philosophical code/rule of conduct. There is no 
economic yard-stick to measure the extent of due process. The legislators of WTO laws 
endeavored to address all the three basic issues of due process. There is no criticism 
regarding bias rule. But hearing rule and no evidence rule is not beyond limitation. In fact, 
lack of remand power of the AB jeopardizes not only the hearing rule, but also the whole 
judicial process. As far as no evidence rule goes, WTO law is not enough to ensure 
objectivity of the trial. Article 17.12 of DSU requires the AB to address each of the 
contended issues covered in the Panel report and legal interpretation developed by the 
Panel. This limits the power of the AB as it says nothing about the contended issues 
remain unattended by the Panel. Same problem arises in case of evidence remains 
unattended by the Panel. Some in-built limitations of law regarding due process can be 
decimated by philosophical sixth sense of the judges. But if the law itself reins in the 
power of adjudicators the consequence is dire. WTO jurisprudence for, reasons unknown, 
does not allow new evidence at appellate stage and this limitation cannot be healed by the 
judges of WTO courts.  
WTO courts follow the generally accepted principal regarding burden of proof/evidence. 
The inquisitorial system of presenting evidence in written form predominates. Oral 
evidence is quit absent and thus no cross examination of witness is required. Other styles 
of presenting evidence, like video, audio are less practiced. In fact, parties and 
adjudicators are seduced by the principal of good faith while relying on written 
submission on evidence which is supported by oral submission. This gentleman 
agreement among the parties is a good recourse for the adjudicators.  
Standard of review of evidence in WTO court system has different and critical facet. The 
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challenge before the court is to what length and to what intensity they can analyze the 
legislation of a sovereign government. While Article 11 gives the general weapon called 
‘objective assessment’, till then the standard is specific to particular agreement, fact and 
circumstances. Generally accepted principal developed through the perspective of Vienna 
Convention and other international legislation to maintain adequate/just deference to the 
Member’s own factual findings or interpretation of legal aspect, specially interpretation of 
domestic legislation, is an important beacon on this issue. However, the adjudicators face 
trouble as because general standards do not entails any accurate/exact yardstick/methods 
of interpretation of law. The situation is further complex as there is no categorical rule for 
standard of proof regarding type and amount of evidence is required to make a 
presumption of truth. Here it is pertinent to state that, like other international legislation 
WTO regimes also lacks the yardstick to assess and evaluate the probative value of 
evidence. In such situation, ‘preponderance of evidence’ or ‘balance of evidence’ based 
on the all available evidence is the operational toll for the judges. However, panel further 
filters other kind of evidence gathered by court per se in the form of expert opinion to 
prevent the distortion of evidence.  
WTO jurisprudence does not offer a harmonized set of rules on technical issues of 
evidentiary matters. This technical rule is essential also because assumption, presumption, 
induction, deduction and inference are commonplace in WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. Rather WTO jurisprudence embraced flexibility on this matter. For instance, 
Article 12.2 of the DSU allows panel procedure to provide sufficient flexibility to ensure 
high quality panel report without unduly delaying panel process. Further, as there is no 
clear cut pre-set rule for the Panel whether to follow common law or civil law system 
while dealing with evidentiary matters legal limbo presents for the parties as well. For 
example, in Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles Apparels and 
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Other Items Argentina raised objection on accepting copy of certain documents instead of 
originals. But the Panel ruled that submission of copies of original documents did not 
affect the probative value of evidence.
86
 Flexibility is also seen as well regarding means 
of presenting evidence and deposition. In absence of hierarchy of evidence the 
adjudicators judges their value on their own. No testimony or affidavit is required in 
support as all the evidences are subject to scrutiny by the judges themselves. Regarding 
timeframe of submission of evidence Working Procedures for Panels
87
 requires factual 
evidence to be submitted before the 1
st
 substantive meeting of the Panel and rebuttal 
evidence to be submitted in 2
nd
 substantive meeting. The AB recognizes this rule several 
times. For example, In Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles 
Apparels and Other Items the Panel allowed USA to submit some evidence 2 days before 
the 2
nd
 substantive meeting and granted Argentina only 14 days to respond and the AB 
consolidated Panel’s decision ruling that Working Procedures for Panels does not have 
any strict deadlines for submission of evidence.
88
 No doubt, in such a legal limbo there is 
certainly a ethical standard which is nothing but ‘due process’. 
WTO jurisprudence is the outcome of consensus among independent states developed 
after traveling almost half century. Parties to a dispute are seduced by the principal of co-
operation and good faith for each issue including evidentiary matters. Parties have the 
duty to collaborate in providing evidences that are in sole possession of either party. 
Principal of good faith demanding cooperation among the members is maintained in 
Article 3.10 of the DSU. Non co-operation means adverse inference
89
 or judgment based 
on best available information. May be, the principal of good faith withered out the 
necessity of pr-set technical rules on evidentiary matters.  
                                           
86 WT/DS56/R, The Panel Report, para 6.58 
87 Appendix 3 of DSU, Paragraph 4,5 & 7 
88 WT/DS56/R, The Appellate Body Report, para 77-81. 
89 Related Case- Canada - aircraft 
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Determining sufficiency of evidence is a big challenge for the Panel. In fact the Panel 
assumes huge liberty on this issue. Though WTO jurisprudence is silent on this issue, the 
Panel and the AB developed some standards regarding sufficiency of evidence. In 
Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles Apparels and Other Item the 
AB upheld Panel’s decision that the US had adduced sufficient evidence to establish the 
prima face case as Argentina did not provide any affirmative evidence to the contrary
90
. 
On ground of sufficiency of evidence, the Panel is not under compulsion to seek 
information or evidence. Nor the party can claim that the AB would exercise its 
unconditional right to seek information. 
WTO legal system has opened the avenue for third party- having substantial trade interest 
in a particular dispute - to present their view on different issues during panel proceedings. 
But DSU is not categorical whether third party can produce evidence in support of claim 
by either of the parties. In criminal justice uncalled for/unsolicited evidence may add 
value to unravel the truth. From holistic viewpoint one may argue that evidence produced 
by third party or unsolicited evidence should be allowed. If so, it may cause some 
diplomatic problem. WTO members may go for grouping/regrouping giving up the 
philosophical ideology of WTO - the global public goods. However the AB legalized the 
unsolicited evidence under the veil of Article 12.1 of the DSU considering the Panel’s 
right to make addition or departure from Working Procedure.  
WTO dispute settlement mechanism is flexible enough to ensure top quality report by the 
Panel. Side by side, the Panel is under compulsion to guard against undue delay to ensure 
fair play. These two inalienable issues contradict each other. Exclusion of evidence 
                                           
90 In Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles Apparels and Other Item United States produced evidence on only 118 tariff categories out of 
alleged 940 tariff categories. That is, out of 940 tariff lines, Argentina collected excess duties in case of 118 tariff lines for textile and apparel products. 
Argentina argued that, if the collected tariff on remaining tariff lines were examined, the overall tariff rate had not exceeded the maximum level of bound rate in 
Argentina’s Schedule. 
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submitted in delay leads to adverse inference. But interestingly adjudicators of WTO 
maintain judicial restraint in many situations. The issues like flexibility of DSU on 
admitting delayed evidence and practice of judicial restraint by the adjudicators may 
seduce the party to restore to litigation technique. To decimate this problem, DSU may set 
for categorical rule on issue of delayed evidence like prescribing sunset rule on 
submission of evidence, requiring the parties to seek prior permission. 
Adjudicators assume huge liberty to garner information from any sources it thinks 
appropriate. Panel has the right to depart from Working Procedure. So, both power and 
right is there to discharge the onerous responsibility to nurture the world public goods 
called WTO by making objective assessment of facts. It may be argued that the power, 
flexibility and right of the Panel to cause addition/ deviation from the WP are more than 
enough to address the evidentiary issues. This argument may not be tenable and well 
founded. The adjudicators are from different law family. So as the other people associated 
with dispute settlement – like office staff of WTO, bureaucrats and lawyers defending 
each state. Subject matters of the disputes are widened. Wide jurisdiction is limited by the 
terms of reference and in setting the terms of reference the Panel has virtually no role; 
even the DSB has very limited rule. So, the course of the adjudication is virtually directed 
by the parties to the dispute. Neither the Panel nor the AB can initiate any legal right of 
any party suo motu.      
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. Some Recommendation 
With the emergence of World Trade Organization, international trade has become rule 
based. So it is logical to think that dispute settlement system would be rule based as well 
to an acceptable extent. If not so, predictability of world trading system would not sustain 
which will cause anarchy in international trading system. Following few ideas may be 
shared by the scholars as well as the law makers of WTO can give a thought to make 
dispute settlement system more pragmatic: 
1. Too much flexibility has overburdened the adjudicators. Similarly, too much 
discretion can be reduced by promulgating rule on different technical matters on 
evidentiary issues.  
2. Categorical rules may be promulgated regarding presumptions, assumption and 
adverse inference. Similarly to ensure cooperation on evidentiary matters legal 
compulsion in DSU may be incorporated. A standard procedure may be developed 
regarding standard of proof and standard of review 
3.  Cross right and obligation present in other trade laws of other regulatory bodies may 
be incorporated as covered agreement of WTO. Existing covered agreements may be 
enriched further incorporating evidentiary matters of complex nature to bridge the gap 
of DSU. 
4. Remand power of AB is essential. Or AB may be given the authority to consider the 
unattended evidence by Panel. 
5. Third parties may be given the chance to bring evidences having additive value.     
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Annexes 
Annex I: Time limit for settling a dispute up to adoption of AB report
91
 
Issues Time Prescribed Comment 
Consultations, Meditation 60 days 
1 year without Appeal 
Setting up Panel and 
appointment of Panelists 
45 Days 
Final Panel report to 
disputed parties 
6 months 
Final Panel Report to 
WTO members 
3 weeks 
DSB adopts report 
(no appeal) 
60 days 
Appeal Report 60-90 days 
1 year 3 months with 
Appeal 
DSB adopts appeal report 30 days 
 
                                           
91  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, date of visiting 30/09/2008 
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Annex II: WTO Dispute Settlement Process 
Broadly dispute settlement system of WTO has four major steps; namely-consultation, 
panel proceedings, appellate review and implementation and enforcement. The whole 
process is shown in the following chart
92
 
 
 
                                           
92 Source- www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm, visited on 16/09/2008. 
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